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 ABSTRACT 
This dissertation develops the analysis of human behaviour which can cause fatalities in the Bus 
and Train Tunnel during a tunnel fire event. The project aim is to utilise the Root Cause Analysis 
framework to produce recommendations for the BaT tunnel design with respect to human 
behavioural fire safety.   
Tunnel fire safety is a young area of research. There is much ambiguity in tunnel fire science and 
includes many unanswered questions such as; human behaviour in relation to tunnel fire 
emergencies with a particular reference to tunnel operators and emergency services.   
The Root Cause Analysis framework was utilised to discover the underlying causes of fatality 
within a tunnel due to human behaviour. The framework allows for the root causes to be discovered 
and ensures that recommendations are produced for each event that has the potential to cause loss of 
life. 
Throughout the study publically available information surrounding the BaT tunnel was documented. 
A literature review was then conducted into the tunnel operations and fire safety within tunnels. 
Following the literature review, extensive data gathering was conducted to include statistics on 
historic tunnel fires and case studies that are applicable to the aims of the study. A root cause 
analysis was carried out pertaining to tunnel fire safety within tunnels. The root cause analysis was 
conducted upon a specified tunnel fire design which utilizes publically available information along 
with assumptions that are based on prescriptive measures. The assumed tunnel fire design root 
cause analysis was undertaken on both the busway and the railway.  
The Root Cause Analysis highlighted that both the busway and the railway had identical root 
causes. The causes of fatality were discovered to be due to Communication breakdowns, slow 
reaction times, inadequate understanding and inadequate maintenance. The ways recommended to 
mitigate these risks is through intensive training of all staff, educating the public through marketing 
and the establishment of sound management within well-defined processes. 
There are many limitations involved within the analysis which cause the recommendations to be 
incomplete. Hence, before implementation of the recommendations the study should be carried out 
upon complete design data.  
The Root cause analysis is an effective framework that could be used to find the causes of risk and 
failure within the BaT tunnel. The framework was effective in identifying the root causes of the 
defined scenario. For a more complete analysis, more scenarios should be analysed, with true 
design data and including the modelling of the ventilation system where possible.  
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 1 INTRODUCTION  
The Bus and Train (BaT) tunnel is a system that incorporates science, engineering, human 
behaviour and social factors which combine to establish an appropriate systemic risk. One major 
risk involved with all tunnels, including the BaT tunnel, is the operation of the fire safety system 
and how human behaviour influences the level of risk associated with fire safety.  The question that 
will be answered throughout this study will be: 
“An analysis of human behaviour which can lead to fatalities in the Bus and Train Tunnel during a 
tunnel fire event” 
The aim and scope of the study will be discussed within chapter 1.1 and chapter 1.2 respectfully. 
Chapter 1.3 will give an introduction to the problem and outline the importance of the proposed 
study.  
1.1 PROJECT AIM 
The project aim is to utilise the Root Cause Analysis framework to produce recommendations for 
the BaT tunnel design with respect to human behavioural fire safety.   
1.2 SCOPE 
The specifications in Appendix 1 outline the six steps that will be involved to ensure the completion 
of this study.  
1. The first step involves the documentation of publically available characteristics and 
proposed operations of the planned BaT tunnel.  
2. Secondly, a literature review was conducted into the tunnel operations and fire safety within 
tunnels where particular focus was given towards public transport.  
3. Data gathering was undertaken from internationally documented studies and fire safety 
literature; the data will include historic tunnel fire statistics for both road and rail tunnels 
and case studies.  
4. Two scenarios were then analysed using the root cause analysis framework which pertained 
to human behavioural impact upon tunnel fire safety, in the context of the BaT tunnels 
design and operations.  
5. The identification of important factors will then be carried out in regards to the human 
behavioural impacts, upon tunnel fire safety, within the bus and train tunnel.  
6. Finally, recommendations will be given in regards to the design of the BaT tunnel based 
upon the findings from the study.  
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1.3 BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Tunnels are beginning to play an increasingly important role within the transportation network of 
Brisbane, Queensland. This is in response to The Queensland Government and Brisbane City 
Council, whom have made congestion management within South-East Queensland (SEQ) one of 
their top priorities. The rate of congestion growth in Brisbane over the next ten years is expected to 
be greater than that of any other Australian capital city (RACQ 2013). The key priorities of the 
Queensland Government, led by Campbell Newman, are to grow a four pillar economy (including 
tourism, agriculture, resources and construction), invest in better infrastructure and better planning, 
revitalise front-line services, lower the cost of living and restore accountability in the Government. 
The BaT (Bus and Train) tunnel is a project that responds to the Newman Governments priorities.  
The BaT project is an innovative solution, proposed in 2013 to help combat the congestion problem 
within South east Queensland. It involves combining bus and train public transport in a decked, 15 
meter diameter, 5.4km long tunnel (see Figure 1 below for a conceptual design). The tunnel will 
pass from Dutton Park, underneath the Brisbane River and Brisbane’s Central Business District 
(CBD), and finally to Victoria Park. The project will incorporate the construction of three new 
underground stations located at Woolloongabba, George Street and Roma Street.  
 
Figure 1 - BaT tunnel concept (DTMR 2014a) 
The idea of decked multi-modal tunnels is not unheard of within the world as the Chongming South 
Channel tunnel, Shanghai will be built to support both motorway and light rail (AECOM 2014). 
 The BaT tunnel is however unique in the fact that it is designed to support public transport only and 
a bus only passage way which are rarely seen. The risks associated are therefore relatively 
unknown.  
Fires pose a major risk within tunnels, due to the lack of extensive knowledge within the area and 
the ability to harm many people from exposure to heat and smoke within a confined space. Tunnel 
fires have led to many fatalities, structural damage and loss of confidence within the tunnel systems. 
The manner in which tunnel users act within a tunnel fire event is unpredictable without the 
development of effective and easy to use systems which are designed to effectively egress humans. 
Due to the lack of knowledge in tunnel fire safety and the responses humans have to such events it 
is important to investigate the potential causes and reduce the likelihood to ensure the risk of 
fatalities is minimised.  Historically there have been many devastating fires within tunnels which, if 
effectively documented, provide interesting insight into the failures of a design due to human 
interaction. Some examples of historic tunnel fires include, but are not limited to:  
 Mont Blanc - 1999 (France/Italy) 
 Tauern – 1999 (Austria) 
  Kitzsteinhorn – 2000 (Austria) 
  Gotthard – 2001 (Switzerland) 
 Dague – 2003 (Korea) 
 Frejus – 2005 (France/Italy) 
The goal of tunnel fire safety is to reduce the potential loss of life through sound designs. Human 
behaviour and ventilation control has had a significant impact upon tunnel fire safety and the 
effectiveness of the associated systems. Human behaviour has historically contributed to an 
unpredictable increase in the risk of tunnel fire safety, which can be illustrated through historic 
events such as the Huguenot tunnel, South Africa 1994 where passengers egressed from a moving 
bus and consequently cause head on crashes and increased the severity of the situation (Beard & 
Carvel 2005).  
This study is important as it investigates the risk of bus only passageways and the risk of combining 
both bus and rail within one tunnel which are both relatively new concepts. The major risk that will 
be investigated is the human behavioural aspect and the relationship that the Staff, authority figures 
and tunnel users play within tunnel fire safety. The study hopes to produce results outlining the 
increased risk that is imposed by the BaT tunnel through human behaviour and effective 
recommendations to the issues.  
4 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
Prior to undertaking a rigours analysis of the BaT tunnels fire safety system in regards to human 
behaviour, a review of the following topics will be undertaken: 
1. Transportation in relation to Brisbane 
2. Brisbane public transport stake holders 
3. BaT tunnel  conceptual design 
All data will be collected from publically available sources. The background information is hoped 
to give context to the difficulties that are currently being encountered within South East Queensland 
(SEQ) and highlight the need for the BaT tunnel. The public transport stake holders and their 
operations will be outlined to describe the complexity involved within the Brisbane transport sector 
and the complexity it imposes upon tunnel fire safety. Finally, the BaT tunnel conceptual design 
will be explained for use within the analysis of tunnel fire safety.   
2.1 TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM IN RELATION TO BRISBANE 
This chapter will provide background will be given into Brisbane’s transportation problem, the 
meaning of traffic congestion and Brisbane’s increasing population. 
 Population and Transport problem 2.1.1
Brisbane city is an uncommon case, where there is a high reliability upon bus transportation and 
houses one of the largest fleets of busses within Australia. The bus fleet consists of approximately 
1,255 busses (BCC 2012). In the morning peak hour, 500 of these buses enter the Brisbane 
metropolitan area and compete for space on the roads with private commuters, taxies and other 
transportation vehicles. There is unreliability and complexity involved with the Brisbane busway 
due to congestion, which has caused a trend towards commuters taking private transportation to 
work. The rail network is nearing capacity along the Merivale Bridge (the only inner city cross river 
rail) and is causing unreliability in the transportation to and from work.  
The Brisbane centre is expected to reach critical capacity soon which is causing a number of social 
and economic implications. The congestion problem will increase with the growth of Brisbane CBD 
and the population of SEQ. (RACQ 2013) 
 Traffic congestion 2.1.2
Traffic congestion, for the purpose of this report, is defined as the interactions between traffic that 
cause a slow in speed, queuing and/or longer trip times (Ayres 2013). Congestion is also 
characterised by occurrences such as traffic jams. The capacity of a network is defined by the 
 maximum number of persons or vehicles that can reasonably pass a point, section or roadway 
within a given time period while acting under prevailing conditions. The units for capacity is 
generally expressed as vehicles/hour or people/hour. (Ayres 2013) 
The operating conditions of roads and other transport networks decreases as the system nears 
capacity. A qualitative measure is used to describe the operational condition from the perception of 
the drivers and pedestrians. This measure is referred to as the ‘level of service’ which is divided in 
six categories from Level of service A, where a condition of free flow exists and commuters can 
choose their travel speed, through to Level of Service F, where the flow is forced and queuing and 
delays are expected.  A graph illustrating the different levels of service based on volume flow and 
speed can be seen below: 
 
Figure 2 - Level of service(Ayres 2013) 
 The factors that affect the level of service within a traffic network consist of; 
 Roadway conditions 
 Terrain conditions 
 Traffic conditions 
 Driver population 
 Population Growth 2.1.3
SEQ is one of the primary centres within Queensland, Australia’s fastest growing state. The 
population in SEQ is forecast to increase from over 3 million to 3.7 million, between 2011 and 2021 
(DTMR 2013). In year 2031 the population is predicted to reach approximately 4.5 million (DTMR 
2013).  
 Proposal of the BaT tunnel 2.1.4
As highlighted above there is need for an innovative design that allows for increase of public 
transportation capacity (both rail and bus), while simultaneously reducing congestion and allowing 
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for ease of flow to and from the CBD. This will have a rippling effect on the efficiency of business 
and economic growth.  
The BaT tunnel is one proposed design that will potentially solve the congestion problem within the 
public transportation system as it allows for the expansion of the bus and rail network 
simultaneously. The BaT tunnel also allows for transportation to key locations in a more efficient 
manner. 
The key design parameters and benefits of the BaT tunnel will be discussed in chapter 2.3. 
2.2 BRISBANE PUBLIC TRANSPORT STAKE HOLDERS  
Within SEQ there are three main companies that carry out the operation, maintenance and logistics 
of the public transport system. These companies include: Translink Transit assiociation, Queensland 
Rail and Brisbane Transport.  
Each of these companies will play a role within the Bus and Train tunnel and the effective 
operations of the tunnel during normal operating conditions, Incident management by altered 
operating conditions and Incident response by tunnel closure. Due the involvement of 3 major 
consortiums it is important to understand their current relationship to discover the changes that need 
to be made for successful operations and to reduce the likelihood of fatality. 
 Brisbane Transport 2.2.1
Brisbane Transport (BT) is responsible for the scheduling of bus services within the Brisbane area.  
BT is under contract by the Translink Transit Authority (TTA) which is a QLD government body. 
TTA provides public transport to South East Queensland (SEQ). 
2.2.1.1 Busway Operations Centre  
The Brisbane busway network is managed from the Busway Operations Centre which is currently 
located in the Brisbane Metropolitan Transport Management Centre (BMTMC). It is a full time 
facility that manages the busway, busway stations and busway tunnels. Within the center the 
Busway safety officers are required to be on duty and they also carry out road patrols.  
Intelligent transport systems are utilized within the busway system. The control center also operates 
with CCTV, vehicle detection systems, tunnel operations systems, tunnel alarm systems, and bus 
station facilities.  
An extensive incident management plan has been developed by Translink. The incident 
management plan involves but is not limited to; Planned incidents, unplanned incidents and special 
unplanned incidents. Planned incidents involve events that may disrupt the system and still adopt 
 the same incident process. These events include road upgrades, infrastructure repair, cleaning and 
maintenance and special/sports carnivals. Unplanned incidents involve events such as accidents, 
terrorist attacks, bomb threats and natural disasters. Special unplanned events require additional 
attention as they are considered special due to the parameters of the infrastructure.  
2.2.1.2 Brisbane Metropolitan Transport Management Centre (BMTMC) 
The BMTMC was jointly established by Brisbane city council and Queensland government which 
incorporated both state and local government road transport operations. BMTMC manages the 
Brisbane region road transport network along with the busways. The centre works together with 
Brisbane city council, Translink, and Brisbane transport to deliver effect traffic and public transport 
conditions.  
 Bus way features  2.2.2
A bus stop is thought of as; points at which a bus will drop off and/or collect commuters along a bus 
route. Bus stops are intended to be in areas of high visibility and lighting, clearly visible to bus 
driver and passengers, close to other stops and/or stations to allow for easy transfer between 
services. The most important operational characteristics of the Brisbane busway is efficiency and 
safety.  
The bus system currently works from: 
 Monday – Friday 5.00 am – 12.30 am; and  
 Saturday – Sunday 12.00 am – 12.00 am.  
 TransLink 2.2.3
Translink is a division within the Department of Transport and Main Roads whom are responsible 
for: 
1. Mass transit in South East Queensland & regional transit via bus, train, ferry and Tram 
2. Demand responsive transit 
3. Active transport 
4. Taxi 
5. Long distance rail, coaches and regional air 
 
Translink partners with a large range of service providers that increases the quality and efficiency 
for public transport, ticketing, information and infrastructure. Translink facilitates the discussion 
between state and local government to improve the transport system and infrastructure within 
Australia.  
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 Queensland Rail 2.2.4
Queensland Rail is responsible for providing adequate rail transport throughout the Brisbane area. 
2.3 BAT CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
To combat the increasing traffic congestion problem in South East Queensland there has been a 
number of projects proposed including; Cross River Rail, Busway upgrade and the BaT project. The 
greatest economic benefits are seen from the BaT project as it provides the benefits of both the 
Cross River Rail and Busway upgrade in a single tunnel.  
During the completion of this project the BaT tunnel was in phase B which involves developing the 
reference design and completing the environmental impact statement. The next stage of the project 
will focus on procurement then following appointment of the preferred proponent the final phase of 
early works, detailed designs and construction will begin. A table of the phases and timelines can be 
seen below in Table 1.  
Table 1 - BaT Project timeline (DTMR 2014a) 
Phase Description Time line 
A Concept Design 2013 
B Reference design and Environmental Impact statement 2014 
C Procurement for construction 2014-2015 
D Detailed design and construction 2015-2020 
 Benefits of the Project 2.3.1
The BaT project will significantly increase the capacity of bus and rail transportation across the 
Brisbane River. It will also increase efficiency and reliability of the system within SEQ as it offers 
higher frequency, faster and direct trips to key locations. The BaT tunnel will reduce private travel 
by approximately 310,000km per day (DTMR 2014a).  
The BaT project is expected to double the capacity of trains crossing the Brisbane river with many 
other great benefits to the transport system in SEQ. With the increase in capacity of the Merivale 
Bridge the South and Cleveland Lines have the capacity to grow. The Capacity to cross the 
Brisbane River will increase from 24 to 48 trains per hour; this also enables the growth of the Gold 
Coast services. BaT allows for future growth south of Brisbane following 2031 and incorporates 
planning to add a new line to Beaudesert by 2031 (DTMR 2014b).  
The maximum number of passengers on the busway travelling from the south of Brisbane to the 
CBD will increase significantly. Capacity will increase from approximately 10,400 to 23,100 per 
hour (DTMR 2013). The capacity for commuters getting to the CBD from the north will increase 
 from 5,200 to approximately 17,900 per hour. The BaT tunnel will ease the bus congestion on the 
Captain Cook Bridge and allow more access for private vehicles.  
Due to the expected increase in appeal for the public transport system, commuters are expected to 
tend away from private transportation and hence allow for higher levels of service through the city. 
This in turn will lead to economic and social growth within the Brisbane and SEQ region.  
 Overview of design 2.3.2
The requirements of the BaT tunnel comprise of stations, tunnels and bridges. It will also involve 
new and modified tracks, rail and bus systems and the services that compliment them. The design 
process will take into account construction techniques, logistics, environment and operational 
issues. BaT is an extension of the Queensland Rail Transit Authority network; it provides new paths 
for commuters to get to their desired locations. The project demonstrates the need for focus on; 
 Fire and life safety 
 Ventilation requirements 
 Reducing the impacts on surrounding built infrastructure i.e. sewerage lines 
 Allowing for future developments 
 Construction techniques 
 Operating with existing infrastructure/systems 
 Layout  2.3.3
The BaT tunnel will run from Dutton Park, underneath Brisbane River and CBD, through to 
Victoria Park in Spring Hill (see Figure 3). There will be stations at Woolloongabba, George Street 
and Roma Street. The grade and depth of the tunnel will be dictated by the train’s maximum 
gradient restrictions and the structural foundations/infrastructure along with underground utility 
services.   
 
Figure 3 – Potential tunnel alignment (DTMR 2014c) 
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 Stations 2.3.4
The new stations will be located at Woolloongabba, George Street and Roma Street.  The stations 
layout will play a key role in the successful operations of system as they will allow for commuters 
to enter and disembark from the platforms and easily access their desired destination. It is therefore 
important to consider the following; ease of flow, detailed and easy to read Information systems, 
appropriate signage, entrance and exits to the station, transportation through the station, dust, 
noise/vibration caused by the transport system, safety and security and sustainability.   
The stations will be designed to cater for the flow of a projected passenger loading for a two-hour 
peak travel period in both the morning and evenings of 2031. The stations will use escalators 
instead of stairs where there is a greater vertical rise than 5.4m. When these escalators are the only 
means for passengers to descend/ascend to the platforms, a minimum of 3 escalators is required, 
this allows for maintenance in the event of a breakdown. The stations are also required to have 
Information systems that will incorporate clear and easy to follow instructions. For the stations to 
remain sustainable the project will incorporate the following initiatives; low energy, capture and 
storage of stormwater, treatment of emissions, recycled material, long design life with high quality 
material, minimisation of impact, maximising to density  
 
Figure 4 - Conceptual design of Woolloongabba Station 
The stations we designed to abide by the following documents: 
 Disability Discrimination act (DDA) 
 Building code of Australia 
 Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport (DSAPT) 
 QLD Rail Station Design Guide 
 Queensland Rail Accessibility Signage Manual 
 Translink Station Signage Manual 
  Brisbane Busway design guidelines 
 Ventilation system 2.3.5
The heat and emissions from the busses will be managed through a ventilation system. The bus fleet 
operates with high level emissions control systems hence leading to low level of emissions flowing 
from the ventilation outlets. The ventilation system is also expected to be capable of dealing with 
smoke in the event of a fire.  
Air flow will be controlled by ducts, fans and control systems. The piston effect will be utilised 
within the railway section in conjunction with fans at the underground stations which are expected 
to draw the air from the tunnel. Jet fans can be avoided within the busway as overhead ducts will be 
provided along the crown of the tunnel. (DTMR 2014b) 
There will be ingress of air at the tunnel portals and at the intakes. The intakes will be positioned at 
each of the stations and released through the ventilation systems. Ventilation outlets will also be 
required at each station and near the southern and northern connection. The proposed ventilation 
outlets and heights can be seen below in Table 2.  
Table 2- Proposed ventilation outlets (DTMR 2014b) 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this study will incorporate the Root Cause Analysis framework (RCA). The 
RCA is intended to identify the root causes of potential loss of life within a tunnel fire in association 
with human behaviour.  
The RCA framework was justified as an appropriate tool for analysis as it allows for the 
identification of what, how and why a fatality occurred, and allows for the generation of appropriate 
recommendations. When it is understood why an event occurs recommendations are more credible. 
RCA are used within industry for a variety of reasons including investigating the cause of a failure, 
risk analysis, and ensuring that all critical aspects of a design are accounted for. The analysis would 
therefore be capable of producing recommendations for the consideration within the BaT tunnel 
design as a result of human behaviour within a tunnel fire. A detailed description and framework for 
a RCA will be explained within section 3.1 below.  
Tunnel fires have occurred frequently in the past and have led to potential loss of life, structural 
damage and high economic/social costs. The following diagram depicts the process that was 
undertaken throughout this study to draw conclusions on the human behaviour which can cause 
fatalities in the Bus and Train tunnel during the event of a fire. This study was undertaken as a desk 
study and hence no laboratory work was conducted. An explanation of each phase is given below, 
with reference to Figure 5. 
The Methodology of the research will identify the process taken to complete the study, the RCA 
methodology and its application to the BaT tunnel fire safety analysis and finally the methodology 
will define what is meant by risk as it is a major element of the study and hence needs to be 
understood.  
 
 
  
Figure 5 - Methodology 
 Phase 1  
Phase 1 involves defining the topic by means of setting the scope and objectives of the research 
project. This phase will also involve an explanation into the importance of the study.  
Refer to appendix 1, to see the project specifications.  The topic in question is: 
“An analysis of human behaviour which can lead to fatalities in the Bus and Train Tunnel during a 
tunnel fire event” 
Phase 2  
After the scope of the project is defined, sufficient documentation will be provided to explain and 
define concepts that will be referred to throughout the course of the study.  Documentation of 
publically available information in relation to the BaT project and Brisbane’s current transport 
needs will also be explained. The topics outlined in Table 3 will be thoroughly documented within 
the respective report section.  
Table 3 – Documentation of publically available information 
Topic Description Report Section  
Brisbane 
Transportation and 
Demographics 
This section discusses Brisbane’s population and 
transportation problems and the impact that this is 
having upon the public transport network. 
2.1 
Brisbane’s public 
transport stake 
holders 
This section discusses the major stake holders 
within SEQ public transport sector and their 
responsibilities. 
2.2 
BaT Conceptual 
design 
This section uses publically available information 
to provide background into the project that will be 
analysed though out the study.  
2.3 
 
Phase 3 
A literature review will be undertaken to provide enough information into the background of the 
problem so scenarios for analysis can be defined. The research will be broad and will include 
information from all aspects of tunnel fire safety to give a full understanding of the tunnel system 
and how it interacts during tunnel emergencies. The topics which will be discussed, a description 
and their respective report section can be seen within Table 4.   
  
 Table 4 - Literature review topics 
Topic Description Report Section  
Fire 
Fire science, tunnel fires and the effect of fires 
upon materials will be discussed 
4.0 
Tunnel Fire risk 
Tunnel fire risk outlines the standard AS4825 – 
2011 Tunnel fire safety and defines the terms of 
prevention and protection 
5.0 
Tunnel Fire Safety 
Components 
The components of tunnel fire safety were 
considered to be; Ventilation, Human Behaviour, 
Fire Mitigation, Tunnel design, Emergency 
Response, Tunnel management, Contingency 
plans, egress times and Information and control 
systems 
6.0 
Operation and 
Maintenance of road 
tunnels 
The operations and maintenance of road tunnels 
as per Austroads. This will be split into operation 
and maintenance and tunnel emergency response.  
7.0 
 
Phase 4  
Following the explanations of major concepts and undertaking a literature review, data gathering 
must be undertaken. The types of data that will be collected are the causes of fires, historical events, 
fatalities and case studies. All data gathering will be undertaken within Chapter 8 of the report.  
This data will then be compiled into a chart which identifies the commonly occurring incidents 
within Chapter 0.  
Phase 5 
Two scenarios will be defined and analysed based upon the BaT tunnels publically available 
information with regards to the layout and operational procedures. Practical assumptions will be 
made using data from the literature review and data gathering in the case that it is required.  
Phase 5 
A RCA will then be carried out following the methodology given below in Chapter 3.1 of the 
report. The RCA will be used for the generation of recommendations for the design of the BaT 
tunnel in relation to tunnel fire safety. 
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3.1 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
 Defining the Process 3.1.1
“In many traditional analyses the most viable casual factors are given all the attention” (Rooney & 
Heuvel 2004) 
Casual factors are defined as the contributors which, if removed, would lead to a reduced event or 
would eliminate such an event. To ensure that all casual factor contributors are identified a Root 
Cause Analysis will be used in the hope that recommendations can be produced in relation to the 
BaT tunnel design for fire safety.  
A RCA will help identify what, how and why an event can occur. Root Causes Analysis (RCA) is a 
process used to investigate casual factors, identify root causes and to produce achievable 
recommendations that prevent a failure from occurring. 
In practice, the root causes of events are generally not identified and hence repetitive short term 
repairs occur and do not solve the underlying issues. The process of RCA involves data collection, 
casual factor charting, identification of root causes, and recommendation identification. RCA is 
used within safety, health environments, quality assurance and production impacts and is therefore 
appropriate for the use within tunnel fire safety. (Rooney & Heuvel 2004) 
Defining the term ‘root cause’ leads to much debate, however for use within the RCA method a 
‘root cause’ will be defined as; 
1. Specific underlying causes  
2. Can be reasonably identified  
3. Management has control to fix 
4. Effective recommendations can be generated to prevent the event occurring again 
RCA involves four steps. The first step is Data collection. Data collection is vital as without an 
understanding of the system, all of the the root causes cannot be identified. Causal factor charting is 
then undertaken, it is a skeleton chart that evolved with information being revealed. Data needs will 
be identified in this process and hence backfilling will occur. Casual factors can be defined as 
contributors; if they are removed it would lead to a reduced event or would eliminate the event. 
Root cause identification then takes place after all casual factors has been identified.  Following the 
identification of root causes recommendations are generated and implemented. (Rooney & Heuvel 
2004)   
 The presentation of the Root cause analysis will be done in a table form such as can be seen in the 
below in Table 5.  
Table 5 - Root Cause analysis presentation of results 
Casual Factor 
Paths through root cause 
maps 
Recommendations 
Casual factors are listed here 
Root causes associated with 
casual factors 
Recommendations based on 
casual factors and root causes 
 
To fill in the table two types of charts will be required. The first chart that will be made will be a 
skeleton chart; this will identify a sequence of events that could occur. Following the production of 
a skeleton chart the casual factors will need to be extracted. For the casual factors a Root cause 
analysis will be undertaken in the form of a chart. Following the production of both charts the 
findings will be documented in a RCA table such as Table 5. Recommendations will then be 
generated for each casual factor. It is important to produce recommendations that are able to be 
implemented.  
 RCA in relation to BaT 3.1.2
To carry out a RCA into the human behaviour which can cause fatalities in the Bus and Train tunnel 
during the event of a fire, the scenario in which a fire occurs must be defined. The definition of the 
scenarios will be explained following the literature review and data gathering and analysis process.  
When conducting the RCA the focus will be upon the human systems causes that lead to fatality 
following the ignition of a fire. The human system is made up of both the humans and the 
environment in which they interact. The fire is assumed to have already ignited and hence the 
skeleton chart will be created for events that occur in the lead up to egress. Within this time period 
there will be many choices that tunnel staff, tunnel users and external bodies such as the emergency 
services can make. It is hoped that the study will produce recommendations into the ways that 
emergency response can be better managed and the impacts of human choices can minimise fatality.  
Although the RCA method is a good tool to determining the root causes of risks pertaining to 
fatality within the Bus and Train tunnel there are many limitations to the methodology that will be 
used within this study. These limitations will be described within Chapter 12.2.  
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3.2 DEFINITION OF RISK  
Tunnel fire safety involves both prevention and protection approaches. Throughout this study, 
tunnel fire safety will be defined as: “the ability to protect lives and prevent fatalities through the 
management of egress”.   
 Risk 3.2.1
There are many risks involved with tunnels. These risks may involve terrorism, structural failure 
and floods however the main risk that will be focused on throughout this study is the risk of tunnel 
fires. Within tunnels a number of safety systems have been installed to reduce fire risk. Such 
systems involve fire detection, ventilation, suppression and alarm systems.  
Mitigating risk can be done using prescriptive and/or performance based decision making. 
Prescriptive regulations give guidelines and codes based on what is seen to be ‘best practices’. 
These regulations have played an integral role within industries and will continue to do so into the 
future. Prescriptive regulations in relation to tunnels have not been extensively developed in relation 
to the fire management of tunnels as many unknowns still exist. It is important to realise that being 
in a world which is constantly changing and growing continuous assessment of risk should be 
undertaken. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
Throughout the study of the BaT tunnel, both prescriptive regulations and performance based risks 
specifically associated with the BaT tunnel will be defined and analysed.  
 Defining risk 3.2.2
Tunnels are systems that incorporate a range of components, within tunnels there are two specific 
types of systems that will be focused upon throughout this dissertation. Human activity system is 
one which consists of the interaction between people with non-human parts and a functional system 
is a system which has a purpose or function.  
Alan Beard, 2004 considered risk to pertain to three general ideas: 
1. Materials should not be viewed in isolation to other parts of the system 
2. The level of risk is result of how the system is put together 
3. Decision making results in the was a system is constructed 
The Root cause analysis will mainly focus upon the human activity system and how tunnel users 
behave when interacting with the fire safety emergency response system. This being said, the 
human system cannot be viewed in isolation from other components and hence elements such as 
ventilation should also be considered throughout the study. Both systems will be analysed to 
 determine the efficiency of the tunnel emergency response system and the human activity 
associated when the emergency response system is activated.   
3.2.2.1 Defining Hazard and risk 
‘Hazard’ is associated with the factors which could potentially lead to/contribute to harm. ‘Risk’ is 
associated with outcomes/consequences of a particular type of harm occurring. Risk is usually 
measured in terms of probability and the degree of harm caused. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
3.2.2.2 Prevention and Protection 
Prevention is known to be measures relating to preventing an event occurring, where protection is 
measures relating to reducing the impact when an incident does occur. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
Prevention and protection will be analysed within the RCA and will focus on means of preventing 
events that could cause harm following the ignition of a fire. Means of protection will also be 
analysed and will focus on aspects of the emergency response system that require protection, 
including human lives.  
 Consequences 3.2.3
There are three levels of consequences that can come out of a tunnel fire. These consist of major, 
medium and minor consequences.  Major consequences are associated with fatalities or severe 
injuries along with severe property damage and disruptions to the operations. Medium 
consequences consist of medium level injuries and/or property damage and medium interruptions to 
the operations. Minor consequences consist of minor/no injuries, minor property damage, and minor 
disruption to the operations. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
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4 FIRE 
Fire characteristics are not simple to define and the behaviour is similarly difficult to predict. The 
means by which fires are extinguished, the length of time taken for fires to ‘burn out’ and the heat 
that is extinguished from these fires is therefore ambiguous. However with more testing and 
monitoring of fires, better understanding of fire science has emerged and hence some estimations 
can be made.   
Each tunnel, including the BaT tunnel, has to take into account fires within the design to ensure a 
desirable level of safety is reached. It is therefore important to have an understanding of the concept 
of fire, the heat that can be produced, the toxic gases that are emitted and how it can be applied in 
the case of mitigating the effects of the fire within the tunnel.   
4.1 BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRE  
Fires require fuel, O
2
 and heat. Reduction of these components leads to reduction in the fire and 
eventually leads to extinguishing of the flames. Airflow leads to cooling along with providing 
additional oxygen to the source. Fires can be enhanced by the addition of oxygen at the fire 
location. Fire can also be suppressed by cooling the ignition source.  (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
4.2 FIRES IN TUNNELS 
 What is a tunnel? 4.2.1
Before discussing the effect of fire within tunnels it is important to firs define what a tunnel is. A 
tunnel is an underground, underwater way, passage that is enclosed and can be accessed by portals. 
(Butterworth & Louis 2010) 
There is a correlation between the length of the tunnel and the risk associated with that tunnel. 
There is no method on how to define a short and long tunnel. As a guideline a short tunnel is 
thought of as one which does not hinder emergency response. (AFAC 2001) 
In terms of emergency operations The Australasian Fire Services Council (AFAC) 2001, 
recommended that a tunnel be classified as long if: 
• Tunnel users have no line of site to a portal or evacuation point (AFAC 2001) 
• During evacuations it is likely that a fire product will come into contact with users (AFAC 2001) 
• When conditions become unsustainable it is likely that firefighting will be carried out (AFAC 
2001) 
 • The maximum useful penetration distance of a breathing apparatus set is not able to support 
personnel to reach the control point (AFAC 2001) 
 
The BaT tunnel could be seen to be a long tunnel as it fits all criteria given by AFAC 2001. The 
BaT tunnel has two portals (Northern and Southern). The distance between the two portals is 
approximately 5.4km long which is required to have evacuation points within the tunnel along with 
the three additional stations at Roma Street, George Street and Woolloongabba station.  
 
Tunnels are confined spaces. This implies that there is a set amount of oxygen within the tunnel and 
hence the tunnel fire is assumed to be constrained by the amount of oxygen that is present. This 
oxygen can be fed to the fire through convection and through the ventilation system.  
Fires can be controlled through ventilation, where the fire size is dictated by the amount of oxygen 
present. Hence there is the ability to reduce the effects of smoke and prevent the fire becoming 
larger through effective operation of the ventilation system. Alternatively, fires can be fuel 
controlled where the heat release is governed by the chemical composition of the fuel.   
 Heat Release Rate (HRR) 4.2.2
The heat release rate of a tunnel is often considered to be the single most important factor involved 
with the severity of a fire. The HRR (measured in MW) can be calculated based on the airflow V 
(m
3
/s), mole fraction of oxygen    , the density of the oxygen     and the heat of combustion for 
the oxygen       which is generally taken as 13kJ/g (Beard & Carvel 2005). The equation for the 
HRR can be seen below: 
                           (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
Hence in tunnels the equation can be approximated to below: 
                      (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
 Temperature within tunnels 4.2.3
There has been a number of test conducted surrounding fires within tunnels and underground space. 
Each test incorporates different elements (length, ventilation systems etc.). As a result of a number 
of investigations occurring into the types of fires that could occur within tunnels a number of 
time/temperature curves have been developed and are utilised for design purposes. Figure 6- 
Time/Temperature curve (Promat 2008)Figure 6 illustrates a number of curves on a 
time/temperature curve, where the tests will be described below. 
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 ISO – Cellulosic curve is a standard fire test that is used for elements of construction based 
on national standards  
 HMC/HC – is applicable to small petroleum type fires which have much greater HRR than 
materials such as wood burns. The HC test should be used when there is potential for small 
hydrocarbon fires to occur. HMC is a modification of the HC test 
 RABT ZTV – this test was developed in Germany, within this test the reinforcement should 
not reach 300 degrees Celsius.   
 RWS – This test was developed in the Netherlands and is based upon the worst case 
scenario; a fuel tanker with 50m
3
 load which is a fire loading of 300MW lasting up to 
120mins.   
 
Figure 6- Time/Temperature curve (Promat 2008) 
Within AS4825-2011 guidelines are given as to which fire resistance should be used in accordance 
to the traffic type. A table of the guideline is seen below in Table 6. However for both bus and rail 
tunnels a fire curve of RABT-ZTV (rail) should be utilised for structural elements. The structural 
elements should be designed to resist 60-120 minutes. Hence the BaT tunnel as a minimum should 
be designed to resists RABT-ZTV (train) fires.  
 Table 6 - Design Criteria for fire resistance AS4825-2011 
 
It is known that all tunnels differ in design and hence a fire will vary depending upon the 
characteristics. The characteristics affecting the fire are gradient, cross sectional area, time/duration 
of the fire, location of the fire, and ventilation speed. (Promat 2008) 
Within a tunnel there are three distinct phases which are described in Figure 7. These consist of fire 
growth, fully developed fire and Decay. There is a flashover period where fires grow to 
temperatures of around 900-1200 degrees Celsius. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
 
Figure 7 - Phases of a typical fire(Beard & Carvel 2005) 
4.3 EFFECT OF FIRE ON MATERIALS 
 Concrete 4.3.1
Concrete is a material that does not contribute considerably to the fire load. High temperatures 
caused by fires and its associated effects, generally lead to a phenomenon known as spalling which 
can undermine the integrity of the structure, this is especially true when reinforcement is exposed 
and burnt.  
Prestressed concrete elements can become detached and lead to a loss of bearing capacity/effect. 
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Spalling is a chemical reaction caused by the sudden increased temperatures inflicted upon the 
concrete due to a fire. The water molecules that are bound within the concrete are released, this 
leads to an increase in volume and hence the concrete will begin to flake/combust. An example of 
spalling can be seen in Figure 8. The high temperatures associated with fires can also cause a 
change in properties of the aggregate which could cause a decrease in volume and hence crumbling 
of concrete. Spalling can also occur when there is a difference in expansion between the concrete 
and the reinforcement bars.  
 
Figure 8- Concrete Spalling 
Spalling can cause a serious economic risk. It has been shown that concretes with increased strength 
under normal conditions are also more susceptible to spalling.  
Tunnel fires can exceed 1300 degrees in just a few moments due to the confined spaces and thermal 
shocks that are imposed upon the structure. There are many time/temp curves to choose from 
(Figure 6) however the lower the curve the lower the cost however it could also induce a higher 
risk.  
  
 5 TUNNEL FIRE RISK 
Tunnel fires are generally more severe than fires that occur within the open, this is due to the 
confined space and its ability to trap heat and smoke. Fire habits within tunnels depend on 
characteristics of the tunnel i.e. length, ventilation, traffic volume. Hence preventative, protection 
and responsive actions for fire safety should be considered within the design phase of the tunnel. 
(Beard & Carvel 2005) 
The level of risk for tunnels is generally based upon the design characteristics of the tunnel along 
with the operational procedure linked to the tunnel. Hence within the BaT tunnel there is need to 
define elements of both the operational and structural system to develop appropriate 
recommendations about the risk involved.   
5.1 AS 4825 – 2011 
The objective of any tunnel should be to design for a sufficient level of fire safety which will 
minimise loss of life, allow for effective operation of emergency response and protect adjoining 
property and third parties. AS4825-2011 is a performance based standard that provides guidance on 
the design, system selection, construction, management and emergency response procedures and 
hence ensures safety is a key component within the design of tunnels.  
This standard will be used throughout the study and will be used to make assumptions about the 
design of the busway and the railway. 
5.2 PREVENTION 
Fire prevention methods exist to ensure that ignition does not occur. Some measures to prevent fires 
within tunnels include (Beard & Carvel 2005): 
 Reducing ignition sources and hot surfaces 
 Using  fire retarding materials where possible  
 Separating fuel and ignition sources where possible 
 Reducing the likelihood of spontaneous ignition  
Some techniques that tunnel operations/designs employs to prevent tunnel fires is to avoid ignited 
fuel sources entering the tunnel through the use of information and control which is described 
within Chapter 6.6. Other techniques involve the prevention of tunnel items from becoming ignited. 
(Beard & Carvel 2005) 
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5.3 PROTECTION 
Fire protection includes passive and active fire protection. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
 Passive 5.3.1
Passive protection relates to features of the tunnel itself. It relates to properties of the tunnels 
construction which act to suppress the spread of fire and smoke, these elements of the tunnel are 
generally there for life.  
There are generally four measures of passive fire protection: 
 Structural Protection 
 Compartmentalisation 
 Passive means of escape 
 Envelope of protection 
Structural protection pertains to measures such as protecting against the effects of heat and the 
transfer to the structural elements. Compartmentalisation relates to division of the structure which 
adds to the fire and smoke resistance. Passive means of escape are the fixed aspects which assist in 
the need for escape from the tunnel. Envelope protection deals with methods of protecting the 
tunnel from external factors that may lead to the ignition of a fire.  
 Active 5.3.2
Active fire protection is operational in the event of a fire. The protection requires a form of 
communication to people and/or equipment about the presence of a fire. Active measures have a 
greater concern with preventing smoke spread as opposed to preventing fire spread. Fire brigades 
and emergency services are included within the active protection approach.  
5.4 RISK ANALYSIS 
A risk analysis is usually undertaken prior to the design of the tunnel. Hazards and risks should be 
identified within the analysis. Limited incidence with tunnel fires has occurred and hence there is a 
significant lack of information surrounding methods of analysing the risk. The outcome of a single 
fire could change the risk profile of the entire tunnel such as the Mont Blanc fire. (AFAC 2001) 
When results from the risk analysis have been developed the level of risk should be accepted by a 
relevant authority. The level of risk associated with the design should consider the following before 
being accepted: 
1. Life safety of motorists and other occupants 
 2. Life safety of emergency service personnel 
3. Facilitation of the emergency services personnel to undertake emergency response. 
4. Limit the impact upon property, business interruptions and environmental effects 
The main risk in tunnels is the vehicles that are travelling within them. The fires are usually caused 
by electrical defects, overheating of brakes and other defects. Statistically, there are fewer fires 
caused due to collisions, mechanical defects and maintenance work within the tunnel than by 
vehicle defects. (AFAC 2001) 
It was found that urban tunnels tend to have higher fire rates than alternative tunnels. Of the tunnels 
that were observed approximately 40% did not have any fires. The final observation from PIARC’s 
study was that the rate of HGV (heavy goods vehicles) fires was higher than that of the passenger 
cars. (AFAC 2001) 
A trend seems to be noticed with tunnels where there is an increased risk of a fire occurring where 
heating within the brake and engine is common (steep grades, tunnel after steep hills, and long 
downward slopes). Upon the initial opening of the tunnel there is an increased risk of fire. (AFAC 
2001) Within the BaT tunnel the grade will be dictated by the grade of the rail and hence there will 
not be significant overheating of brakes and engines within the tunnel.  
It can be said that the level of tunnel safety is a result of three main contributing factors: 
1. Tunnel design 
2. Tunnel management 
3. Emergency response 
 Tunnel design 5.4.1
Tunnels designed with bidirectional flow differ from tunnels which involve unidirectional flow. The 
design flow direction within the tubes dictates the ease of emergency response to access the site. 
Tubes which have traffic flowing in both directions have a higher likelihood of crashes and the 
ability for locomotives to cue in both directions. Cross passages and service tunnels increase the 
likelihood of passenger survival up egress however they are not fool proof, the St Gotthard tunnel 
for instance had 11 fatalities despite the passages within 2011 (Beard & Carvel 2005). 
Consideration should also be given to the days taken to service the tunnel and the 
logistics/consequence of diverting traffic.  Length, cross section and other dimensions are important 
parameters involved with the rate and level of heat and smoke build up. The dimensions also play a 
role in determining the feasibility of having emergency walkways along the side of the pathway. It 
is hard to change the major design once the tunnel has been constructed and hence consideration of 
all aspects must be taken into account.  
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The fixed installations have an impact on the effectiveness of the system and the ability for people 
to egress and emergency response to ingress. The ventilation system is used for exhaust, and supply 
of fresh air. Systems have also been put in place purely for use within an emergency. Natural 
ventilation should be factored into the emergency response in addition to mechanical ventilation 
systems. Other installed goods that need to be considered is firefighting equipment, phones, alarm 
systems and other sensory equipment.  
 Tunnel management  5.4.2
Within tunnels, management is required within operations, traffic and engineering. One of the most 
critical of these is traffic management. The main factors that need to be considered with tunnel 
traffic management include volume, speed and vehicle type. The heat output of buses is much 
higher than for cars, where it was estimated that a tunnel fire within Oslo, Norway in 1996 
experienced heats of around 36MW after 6-10 minutes (Beard & Carvel 2005). Fires involving 
HGV have been known to reach heat outputs of approximately 100 – 300 MW (Beard & Carvel 
2005). 
 Emergency response 5.4.3
Emergency response is the final stage at providing safety within the tunnel. There are two 
categories of emergency response: 
 Normal emergency services 
 Special tunnel emergency teams 
  
 6 TUNNEL FIRE SAFETY COMPONENTS 
Before analysis of the BaT tunnels fire safety system can be conducted it is important to first 
understand the components that are considered within tunnel design to ensure fire safety. Within 
tunnels there are a number of elements that need to be considered. Each of these elements has an 
impact, to some degree on emergency response. A tunnel should consider the emergency response 
system during design and pay particular attention to the facility ventilation, human behaviour, and 
fire mitigation. (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
It is important to consider the following when designing tunnels and drawing from historic events; 
1. All tunnels are different (length, cross section, construction, terrain, gradient, ventilation 
conditions, traffic flow etc.)  
2. Tunnels are a dynamic (changing) system 
3. New material should be considered and both advantages and disadvantageous looked at 
4. Economics always plays a role within design selection unless there is reasons not to 
6.1 VENTILATION SYSTEM 
A ventilation system within tunnels is generally required to remove the contaminants produced by 
traffic. It involves the circulation of air and can occur using a natural effect, traffic induced piston 
effect or by mechanical effect. The ventilation system should be chosen as the most cost effective 
for construction and operation to produce an acceptable level of risk. Within tunnels it is also 
important that there is adequate smoke control, heated gas control, environments suitable for 
evacuation and rescue. Emergency ventilation can be natural (using the buoyancy effect) or 
mechanical.  (Modic 2003) 
Three types of ventilation operational modes exists; normal, emergency and temporary ventilation. 
Emergency ventilation should remove smoke and hot gasses in the event of a fire. The ventilation 
system should allow an evacuation environment which has low temperatures and is relatively 
smoke free. (Modic 2003)  
A ventilation study should be conducted which will lead to development of a fire ventilation plan. 
This should account for spread of fire, smoke, toxic gases and heat in the tunnel. Different types of 
ventilation systems should be considered to find a suitable system for the tunnel in question. The 
ability for the ventilation system to suppress fires should be included in the study (Thompson & 
et.al 2011). 
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Provisions of fire safety has been known to depend upon the length of the tunnel (definition of 
tunnel length can be found in Section 4.2.1). Guidelines have been established by several countries 
relating to the adoption of natural ventilation in relation to the length of the road tunnel – refer to 
Table 7. In early civilisation natural ventilation was utilised, whereas today more stringent measures 
need to be adopted along with the invention of steam engines/combustion engines.   
Table 7 - Countries guidelines on the use of natural ventilation in relation to the tunnel length (AFAC 2001) 
Country Safety length Condition Guideline 
Germany 350m – 700m Below safety length Safe without emergency 
exits and mechanical 
ventilation 
France Urban – 300m 
Non Urban – 500m 
Non Urban – 800m-1000m 
(if traffic <2000 vehicles per 
day per direction) 
Above safety length Smoke control measures 
are required 
UK 400m Below Safety length Allowed to adopt natural 
ventilation with 
justification 
Netherlands - - Decide by risk analysis 
USA 240m Below safety length Allowed to adopt natural 
ventilation 
 
Natural ventilation is seen to be inconsistent as it relies mainly upon the meteorological conditions. 
The main condition having an impact upon natural ventilation is the pressure difference between the 
two tunnel portals, this is caused by elevation, temperature and wind differences (Beard & Carvel 
2005). For more reliable means of ventilation mechanical systems are installed into tunnels (Beard 
& Carvel 2005). One of the first recorded mechanical ventilation systems was within a Holland 
Tunnel in the 1920’s. This was in response to the increasing concern over the combustion engines 
within road vehicles.  
Ventilation systems can be categorised into two large groups; Longitudinal and Transverse.  
 Longitudinal Ventilation 6.1.1
Longitudinal ventilation is applied most often to metro and railway tunnels (Beard & Carvel 2005). 
Within longitudinal ventilation systems the air flows longitudinally through the tunnels. The 
purpose is to move clean air into the tunnel and push heated and polluted air through and out the 
opposite portal. Refer to Figure 9 and Figure 10 below.  
 
  
Figure 9- Injection type (Saccardo nozzle) Longitudinal Ventilation example (Kusta 2012) 
Mechanical Longitudinal ventilation is referred to as any system that introduces or removes are 
from the infrastructure. Hence the system creates longitudinal airflow through the tunnel. There are 
two main forms of longitudinal ventilation; Injection-type and the employment of Jet fans. 
The injection type system is most common within rail way tunnels. It involves the use of a Saccardo 
Nozzle which induces the high velocity injection of air into one end of the tunnel as a low angle to 
induce airflow through the tunnel. Refer to Figure 9 above. 
 
Figure 10 - Longitudinal ventilation example 2 - Use of jet fans (Kusta 2012) 
Jet Fan longitudinal ventilation systems (Figure 10), involves a series of fans installed along the 
tunnels roof.  
An alternate means of longitudinal ventilation is the use of two shafts located close to the centre. 
One shaft takes in the exhaust and the alternate supplies air (Figure 11). This ventilation system will 
lead to a reduction in temperature and air pollution at the shafts due to the extraction of air and 
supply of air at ambient condition. (Beard & Carvel 2005)  
32 
 
 
Figure 11 - Two-shaft longitudinal ventilation (Beard & Carvel 2005) 
 Transverse 6.1.2
Transverse ventilation involves the uniform distribution of air along the length of the tunnel. Three 
forms of transverse systems are employed within industry; Fully Transverse, Semi-transverse 
(exhaust) and Semi – transverse (supply). 
Fully Transverse ventilation systems (refer to Figure 12), involves an exhaust duct that runs the full 
length of the tunnel which is complimented with a full length supply duct. This system was 
developed in New York and has been primarily been used for long road tunnels (Beard & Carvel 
2005). It has however been shown that this type of ventilation system does not have the capacity to 
control smoke and heated gasses within a large fire (MTFVTP 1995). 
 
Figure 12 - Fully transverse ventilation system(Beard & Carvel 2005) 
Semi-transverse ventilation systems (Figure 13 and Figure 14), provide uniform distribution or 
collection of air over the entire length of the tunnel. There are two forms of semi-transverse 
systems; exhaust and supply. 
1. Exhaust semi-transverse system, will produce a finite amount of exhaust (pollutants and 
temperature) at the exit portal. In the event of a fire the smoke will be extracted through the 
system (Figure 14). 
 2. Supply semi-transverse systems (Figure 13), will cause a uniform level of pollutants and 
temperature. In the event of a fire the smoke will be diluted by the supply system. However 
it is preferred to have a reverse cycle within the supply ventilation system to help with fire-
fighting efforts and ensure the air enters the tunnel through the portals. (Beard & Carvel 
2005) 
 
Figure 13 – Supply semi- Transverse ventilation system(Beard & Carvel 2005) 
  
 
Figure 14 - Exhaust semi-transverse system(Beard & Carvel 2005) 
There have been circumstances where a combination of systems are utilised to increase the 
extraction of pollutions throughout the system and allow for improved fire life safety. An example 
is the Sydney Harbour Tunnel which utilises both longitudinal and transverse ventilation is present.  
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6.2 VENTILATION COMPONENTS 
Tunnel ventilation systems are made up of many components; fans, dampeners, motors and 
controls. Each of the components will be described below. 
 Fans 6.2.1
Ventilation fans are utilised within tunnels to create a continuous airflow. The rotary blade within 
the fan creates a force on the air and therefore maintains the airflow and increases the pressure. 
There are two types of fans; axial and centrifugal. 
1. Axial flow fan (Figure 15) 
2. Centrifugal fan 
Axial flow fans (Figure 15) are generally parallel to the 
impeller shaft. They are designed to withstand the maximum 
pressure and temperatures that are expected within tunnels. 
Reversing the flow of air through the fans is possible by 
reversing the motor rotations.  
Centrifugal fans have rotating wheels. Air enters parallel to 
the fan shaft and is discharged at 90 degrees to the shaft.  
 Dampers 6.2.2
Dampers primary function is to control the flow of air in the ventilation system. The dampers can 
provide resistance within the system and hence vary the flow rate of the air. In emergencies 
dampers can be used to vary the exhaust and inflow to control the fire level. There are sliding blade 
dampers and rotary blade dampers.  
 Motors 6.2.3
Tunnel ventilation fans are generally driven by motors. The motors are selected based on fan speed 
and its design requirements. 
 System control 6.2.4
The control of ventilation systems can be manual or automatic and operated locally or remotely (see 
section 7.2 for more information) 
Figure 15 - Axial flow fan 
 6.3 HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
When designing the fire safety system, human behaviour must be taken into account. The behaviour 
during a tunnel fire is similar to that of other buildings (Kobes et al. 2010). The most important 
aspect of tunnel fire safety is therefore considered to be the ability for egress in the event of a fire.  
One major difference between road tunnel fires and building fires is that humans are generally 
reluctant to exit their vehicles and leave their belongings behind.  
There are three critical factors that are involved with survival in the event of a fire; the fire 
characteristics, human features and the building design and operations. The role of a person has a 
large contributing effect on the behaviour of the individual during the event of evacuation. 
 
Figure 16- Variables affecting human performance in fires (Kobes et al. 2008) 
The nature of the fire is a major component of fire response performance. The fires critical 
characteristics involve the smoke, toxicity, heat and growth rate (as seen in Figure 16).  
The engineering features of the building are relevant to the fire response performance. This involves 
the layout, installations, materials, fire compartments and size. The accessibility and signage 
relating the emergency exits play a big role in egress. Effective exit was discovered to be 
approximately 60 persons/meter/minute (Kobes et al. 2010). It has also been revealed that within 
buildings, emergency exits that are not used in everyday situations will also not be utilized during 
an actual emergency. A survey conducted by Kobes et al. (2010) showed that out of 400 cases of 
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fire escape, 92% of people were unaware of the signage that pertained to emergency response 
(Kobes et al. 2010). People were also found to ignore fire alarms, and generally walk slower when 
exposed to fire effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most crucial moment in tunnel fire response is the first moments after the incident has 
occurred. Within three fatal tunnel fires in Europe it was found that motorist ignored red signals, 
stop signs and alarms and continued to proceed through the tunnel, this lead to fire spreading and 
increase mortality. The Sydney Harbour Tunnel in Australia used this study to employ a new 
strategy to stop motorists entering the tunnel which involves projecting stop signals onto a 
cascading wall of water (Figure 17). 
 Stages of Behaviour within tunnel fires 6.3.1
In the event of a fire it has been seen in historical events such as the Tauern Tunnel, Austria 1999 
that the smoke spreads quickly through the tunnel. In this particular case smoke was traveling 
through the tunnel within 2 minutes. The incident reviews associated with the Tauern tunnel 
showed that smoke was a contributing factor to the human behaviour. (Fraser-Mitchell & Harters 
2005) 
6.3.1.1 Recognition  
The first stage of tunnel fire safety is the recognition of an existing fire. The recognition period has 
a focus upon the communication. Communication can be done between different levels of the 
authority hierarchy and should be open, direct, short and to the point. The communication system 
should be reliable.  
The communication between the authorities and the members of the public is important to persuade 
the passengers of the importance to behave appropriately. For effective response the users must be 
Figure 17 - Sydney Harbour Bridge stop signals (Burns et al. 
2013) 
 convinced that an emergency is genuine. There are sometimes difficulties in conveying messages 
due to language barriers, background noise and disabilities. There have been problems with lack of 
information to tunnel users during the wait periods.  
Communication can also be carried out between members of the public. This communication is 
restricted to verbal and visual communication. Public interact with authorities to raise alarms and 
ask for assistance.  
6.3.1.2 Response  
Non-egress activities are generally undertaken by authority figures which are in response to their 
roles and training. Occasionally the public engages in efforts to fight fires. The cause for the public 
engagement is unknown and thought to be either due to the responsibility felt by the tunnel user or 
due to taking of responsibility as an “authority figure”. Non-egress activities involve attempts to 
smoulder the fire, rescue operations and keeping the passengers informed. (Fraser-Mitchell & 
Harters 2005) 
Egress activities can begin with group formations. Building fire research has shown that social 
groups stay together. The tightest group is generally family groups. Social affiliations may also 
form larger groups; these types of groups generally cause higher fatalities as they are generally 
disorganised and less receptive. In the case that a group leader emerges and acts quickly within the 
large group, social affiliations can be a huge benefit.  
There is a large reluctance to leave baggage behind, many bus and train passengers have been 
known to try and bring their baggage with them. It has been observed that baggage tends to slow 
tunnel users by approximately 50%. (Fraser-Mitchell & Harters 2005) 
6.3.1.3 Exit/direction choice 
Within tunnels the authority figures are generally familiar with the layout of the tunnel and would 
consequently use the tunnel exits. The direction will usually be in the opposite direction to the 
tunnel fire. (Fraser-Mitchell & Harters 2005) 
 Roles and Behaviour 6.3.2
There are a number of people that can be present within a tunnel, they may include: 
 Members of the public 
 Tunnel staff (ventilation control, station staff etc.) 
 Members of the rescue and emergency response team 
 Bus drivers 
 Rail staff  
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The response of the control room has a carryover effect on the delay before the emergency response 
and rescue teams are notified. The control room can delay the evacuation of tunnel users depending 
upon the system that they have in place. Some patterns of the behaviour displayed depending upon 
the assumed role will be outlined below. 
Members of the public do not seek out information and generally wait for it to be delivered to them. 
They generally can only communicate face to face or via gestures. The formation of groups is 
possible if instructed to do so, otherwise only the pre-existing groups will huddle. Disabled personal 
generally receive help or have helpers with them. (Fraser-Mitchell & Harters 2005) 
Authority figures take action and investigate prior to positively reacting to a situation. They tend to 
fight fire and give instructions/orders to the public. The staff search and rescue/inform those in need 
and generally assist those who need help.  
The fire services will travel towards the fire in attempt to extinguish and help the individuals that 
they encounter along the way.   
6.4 FIRE MITIGATION 
Fire configuration is determined by a combination of parameters; fire surface height, tunnel height, 
fire size and the flame height.  
Longitudinal ventilation systems utilise jet fans to push smoke to one side of the tunnel which can 
be effective in the event of a small fire. When airflow is too low to deal with the influx of smoke 
from a fire within the ventilation system, smoke may flow against the air flow intended. This 
phenomenon is known as ‘back-layering’ (refer to Figure 18). This causes a flow of smoke in both 
the upstream and downstream direction.  This indicates that the velocity of the longitudinal 
ventilation system should be greater than a determined critical value which will prevent the back-
layering of smoke.  (Modic 2003) 
 
Figure 18 - Back-layering (Hu, Huo & Chow 2008) 
 Within ventilation controlled fires it is important that excess oxygen is not supplied. If air flow is 
too high infernos can be created such as in the St Gotthard tunnel fire 2001. Figure 19 shows the use 
of ventilation to extract the smoke while still providing oxygen for the tunnel users to escape. 
 
Figure 19 – Ventilation control - (Kwa 2014) 
 Fire detection 6.4.1
The first signs of a fire are smoke and heat. These effects of fires are potential deadly for tunnel 
users as it can potentially fill the tunnel. The ability to detect smoke, heat and flames early by tunnel 
operators can result in earlier activation of smoke extraction system and add to the likelihood of 
users to escape. The damage of fires increases with the time taken to intervene.  
 Fire design  6.4.2
Design fires are used to decide upon the criteria of the tunnel and to test the ability of the tunnel 
parameters and operations. A number of design fires should be chosen to represent different fire 
scenarios within the tunnel. Design fires should consider a number of different parameters, some 
possible parameters to considered consist of but are not limited to; Length and width of the tunnel, 
construction material, operation of the tunnel and availability of the emergency exits.  
Within the Root Cause Analysis method there is a need to define a design fire which allows for the 
analysis of the human behaviour in relation to the design fire. Given a different scenario there 
would be different reactions and hence justification of the events must be carried out.  
There is a distinct relationship between tunnel length and the design fire which should be 
considered with defining the parameters of the design fires. The relationship includes the following 
factors: 
1. Increasing fire frequency as a result of the tunnel traffic 
2. Fires can develop without effective control 
3. Increasing airflow in the tunnel to establish an escape route and the consequences of this 
action 
4. Tunnel profile and gradients  
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The BaT tunnel is a long tunnel which involves high traffic flow during peak hour traffic and will 
increase with the increasing population. As the tunnel is long it is important that the ventilation is 
controlled in an effective manner during emergency response. It should be such that the fire smoke 
can be minimised to allow egress and emergency services to ingress and not fuel the fire with 
oxygen. Hence the ability to extract smoke through an overhead duct while receiving oxygen from 
the portals is a good design which should be investigated further.  
Design fire can consist of a number of scenarios including collisions, pool fires (usually involve 
DGV’s and flowing liquid spill fires) and incidence involving one driver.  
  
 6.5 EGRESS TIMES  
Egress times were estimated via the following formulae by Beard and Carvel (2005): 
                         
                                                    
                       
                                                                            
                                                                                
            
6.6 INFORMATION AND CONTROL 
Within society, reliance on technology is evident. Some reasons for this trend include the increased 
reliability, increased productivity, reduced costs and more efficient systems that come with 
technology use. Therefore, it is no surprise that most modern systems, such as tunnels, utilise an 
industrial control system. SCADA (Supervisory control and data acquisition) is an industrial control 
system that provides for the effective monitoring, gathering and processing of data. It can also send 
out commands instantaneously to components of a system at the decision of the operator.  
Information and control systems are important within tunnels as they provide for efficient and 
effective monitoring. The system has the ability to monitor multiple activities and ensures that 
attention is drawn to components of the system that is not operating at its full potential.  
An outline will be given about SCADA and its application to tunnels bellow. 
 Supervisory control and data acquisition 6.6.1
SCADA (Supervisory control and data acquisition), allows for the supervision and monitoring of 
real time data within a larger system such as a tunnel (Daneels & Salter 1999). The SCADA system 
takes inputs and produces outputs through a number of interfaces that are outlined below in Table 8 
- SCADA interfaces. SCADA systems are generally easy to integrate with other automated systems 
such as the Digital Addressable Lighting Interface (DALI). The system can simultaneously handle a 
large number of inputs/outputs (over 100 thousand). SCADA systems provide reliability and 
efficient performances. (Daneels & Salter 1999) 
Tunnels are one example of where SCADA systems can be utilised. Tunnel SCADA systems are 
generally operated out of a control centre. The size of the tunnel will dictate the location of the 
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control centre. Control systems within tunnels also contain emergency detection and response 
systems. The considerations of what possibly needs to be included within the SCADA system for a 
tunnel may include but is not limited to (Innovation2integration 2014): 
1. Lighting 
2. Ventilation system 
3. CCTV 
4. Fire detection system 
5. Fire deluge system 
6. Tele control 
7. Energy 
8. Public announcement system 
9. Incident detection system 
10. Communications systems 
11. Traffic control systems 
12. Radio and Wireless 
Depending upon the size and design of a tunnel, operations can form a complex system. Complex 
systems require real time data analysis. Data is exchange between all systems allowing for the 
desired/programmed transactions to be carried out automatically or via user commands. SCADA is 
known to be used within tunnel control centres. Within a SCADA system there are a number of 
interfaces including those seen in Table 8. 
The SCADA system can pre-empt decisions based on particular inputs. An example of the systems 
pre-empt decision making process would involve changing ventilation velocities based on the 
number of cars entering the tunnel. To install a successful SCADA system firstly the physical 
infrastructure must be properly understood along with the desired outcomes to ensure that correct 
results occur relevant to certain situations. 
The SCADA system should be able to link to all automation devices and sensors within the tunnel.  
  
Figure 20 - Example of tunnel control room 
 Table 8 - SCADA interfaces 
Interface Definition Example/picture 
GUI (Graphical user 
interface)  
The GUI allows users to interact 
with the screen via clicking and 
dragging as an alternative to 
entering text in command lines 
(Terms 2014) 
Windows and Mac are GUI-
based 
PLC (Programmable Logic 
control)  
Used for automation and 
electromechanical processes. 
Used to control machinery via 
taking inputs and giving outputs 
based on information provided 
via inputs.  
Amusement rides utilise 
PLC’s 
RTU (remote terminal unit) RTU’s primary role is to collect 
data and transmit the data back 
to the control centre. No 
processing and decisions are 
made by the RTU based upon 
the data provided.  
Used within Meteorology 
stations  
HID The HDI (Human interface 
device) is the interface that 
allows interaction with humans. 
Computers.  
CCTV CCTV (closed-circuit television) 
is a TV system that is monitored 
and is generally utilised for 
security.  
 
 
 Intelligent Transportation systems (ITS) 6.6.2
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) purpose is to create a safer, more efficient and cleaner 
transportation system. It incorporates satellite navigation systems, variable message signage, toll 
systems and traffic and road information systems. It allows for in-vehicle systems, vehicle-to-
vehicle, and vehicle-to-infrastructure. One major advantage to infrastructure is the use of real time 
data that can be accessed for the use of traffic volume estimation.  
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7 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ROAD TUNNELS 
Sound Operations and Maintenance is vital to the delivery of sustainable infrastructure and ensuring 
that objectives are met (such as design life). Over the life span of tunnels there will be many 
changes to parameters which influence the design of the tunnels. Some changing parameters may 
include the traffic volume, new fuel sources for vehicles (electric cars), external conditions such as 
weather, or the commissioning of new rolling stock within railway tunnels. The importance to have 
flexible and innovative designs which account for future flows and design parameters is therefore 
highlighted. These changes may also have an effect upon the operations and maintenance of the 
system and hence should be continuously revised to increase the efficiency and lower risks. Due to 
the constant changes associated with tunnels, they are often referred to being dynamic in nature. 
Learning from historic events also plays a significant role in defining the operations and 
maintenance of a tunnel. 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) manuals are key instruments used to conduct efficient and 
effective O&M throughout time. The following information is aimed at giving a more in-depth 
explanation of what expertise Australia has within tunnel operations and maintenance and how it 
relates back to tunnel fire safety. Hence the following will include O&M definition, defining a 
tunnel, single modal tunnel operation guidelines, Quality of O&M along with Interchange O&M.   
The following information provided will be used as a background to the findings from the 
Literature review and Analysis and Discussion of Results.  
7.1 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE  
In context with this dissertation we will be focusing on the design, monitoring and control of 
emergency response operations locally, domestically and to an extent internationally and how that 
relates back to the BaT tunnel operations (Ceder 2007). However the following information will 
mainly focus on the expertise that is available in Australian as official publications from Austroads, 
which is developed to improve Australian transport outcomes.  
Maintenance and Operations generally complement each other as they are ongoing and rely on the 
counterpart for success within the system (Butterworth & Louis 2010). Maintenance involves both 
corrective and mitigating actions to ensure the equipment, machinery and/or system involved within 
the transportation network is running at acceptable operating standards and the maximum operating 
life is achieved.  
  O&M Manuals 7.1.1
Operation and maintenance manuals should be completed after the construction of a project 
however, before the commissioning of the project. The manual should be completed in joint 
collaboration between the owner/developer, the design team, the contractor, the property manager 
and any other involved party.  (Butterworth & Louis 2010) 
When developing the manual it is important to identify key design elements, systems and materials. 
For many projects, and components of projects, a majority of the operation and maintenance 
manuals will currently exist for similar designs and hence will only require assembling and/or 
modifications to suit specific circumstance.  
The BaT tunnel has similar components to many tunnel designs around the world and hence the 
BaT tunnel O&M manual can extract pieces of information from tunnels around the world i.e. 
SMART tunnel, ØRESUNDSBRUN, and even the Clem 7. However, as the BaT tunnel will be 
used solely for public transport and Brisbane has unique relationships between the transportation 
systems (refer to Chapter 2.2) new relationships may have to be developed to ensure that all 
components of the operation runs effectively. 
 Single modal tunnel operations 7.1.2
Tunnel operations consider three main situations (Butterworth & Louis 2010): 
1. Normal operations  
2. Incident management by altered operating conditions  
3. Incident response by tunnel closure 
Butterworth and Louis, 2010 states that Australia’s single modal tunnel operations have been 
considered to incorporate: 
 Monitoring of traffic flowing through the tunnel 
 Managing Signage and announcements 
 Emergency response (roadside emergency phone calls) 
 Liaison with emergency response teams 
 Control of tunnel equipment and safety equipment 
 Dispatch support vehicles, incident response personnel and roadside assist vehicles  
 Implementing emergency response procedures 
To ensure the design life span of transport infrastructure safe, reliable and effective operation and 
maintenance is required. This is especially true in circumstances where the tunnel is a part of a 
larger network where the effects of an emergency can transfer throughout the system. Tunnels that 
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have limited options in terms of egress for commuters upon entering a tunnel also pose particular 
concerns for the operation and maintenance (Butterworth & Louis 2010). 
The BaT tunnel is expected to connect with the existing network of tunnels within Brisbane through 
realigning the current road network i.e. easy access to the Legacy Way tunnel from the Northern 
Portal. This means clear signs will be required to ensure that the network can be easily navigated by 
the public transport system. Upon entering the BaT tunnel the only option to exit the tunnel will be 
the opposite portal. Hence it is important to ensure that the tunnels have effective O&M and a sound 
emergency response system in place.   
The Austroad guide to road tunnels, 2010 encourages operation guidelines to consider: 
 Management and control of systems associated with traffic management (i.e. tolls, vehicles 
entering and exiting the facility) 
 Management of tunnel plant and equipment (i.e. sump pumps, air conditioning) 
 Ready entrance into the tunnel  
 Network interface and impact 
 Maintenance facilities 
The size and capacity of the tunnel in question will dictate the level of operations required. The 
operation of tunnels could consequently range from being operated as part of a larger network 
through to having a dedicated control room with continuous surveillance.  
Continuous surveillance will be required for the BaT tunnel, not only because it is a large tunnel 
which will have a high frequency of commuters entering the tunnel but also because it is a major 
component of the Public transport system where timely operation of the bus and train services is 
required.     
People and documentation is important to the organisational structure surrounding the management 
of road tunnels. People involved within the organisational structure are required to be familiar with 
each role. Minimum requirements include; 
 An organisation chart. This chart should show the titles and relationships between members 
on the O&M team  
  Position descriptions should be readily available which states the operational 
authority/levels of access.  
  Flow charts showing the relationship between the O&M organisation and external 
stakeholders, such as client, other traffic management agencies, the police service, 
emergency services and other relevant authorities.  
  Supporting interface protocols agreed by the relevant parties. 
To ensure the consistency of operation of a tunnel the processes should be known to all involved 
within the organisation’s structure and to all relevant stakeholders, the minimum standards for road 
tunnels involves (Butterworth & Louis 2010): 
 traffic management plan and traffic control procedures  
 an incident management plan and incident response procedures (including protocols for 
intervention by police and emergency services)  
 an asset management plan and maintenance schedule, standards and procedures  
 a safety management plan  
 an environmental management plan  
 a training management plan  
 system and equipment operation and maintenance manuals 
 
Risk is generally reduced in the design and planning stage of the road tunnel. For existing road 
tunnels the reduction of residual risk is concentrated upon, it is therefore important to carry out 
operations that will reduce the likelihood of a particular event occurring. 
To ensure consistency between documentation, the operations documents should be written to 
comply with: 
 AS/NZS ISO 10005:2006  
 AS ISO 10013:2003 
These standards will be described in more detail in Quality of O&M within section 7.1.3.  
Continuous communication should be maintained between the stakeholders of the road authorities, 
tunnel owners and operators to allow for, where possible, a consistent approach to tunnel operations 
and a consistent approach to driver information.  
7.1.2.1 Operations objectives 
Single modal tunnel operators aim to achieve certain objectives. These objectives will depend upon 
the characteristics of the tunnel. It is very likely that the characteristics of the tunnel will change 
throughout the lifetime of the tunnel (i.e. the usage of the tunnel) and hence operations may change 
over time. Typical objectives of tunnels include: 
 Safe passage through the tunnel 
 A high level of service leading to reduced travel times 
 Reliable travel time 
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 Fast and effective incident response 
 Maintain air quality (within the standard range)  
 Maintain external air quality within prescribed limits 
 Improve the performance of the road network 
 Information to road users is clearly, timely and effectively distributed and displayed to road 
users 
 Coordination and collaboration with road network stakeholders 
The implementation of a traffic management plan that incorporates a safe and effective traffic route 
that utilizes the bigger road network should be agreed upon by the owner/operator and the relevant 
road authorities. The requirements for traffic management and control equipment are set out by 
Austroads.  
 Quality of O&M 7.1.3
When creating the operation and maintenance objectives it is important to ensure all documents are 
written clearly and concisely. All procedures should be documented and written to an acceptable 
standard. 
7.1.3.1 AS/NZS ISO 10005:2006  
 
This standard ‘Quality management systems - Guidelines for quality plans’ outlines the procedure 
for the development, review, acceptance, application and revision of quality plans. Within the 
document advice is given on identifying the need and inputs of a quality plan. Below in Figure 21 
the process that should be followed to allow continual improvement of the quality plan is seen.  
Within tunnels continuous improvement to the operations is required and revisions can be made 
through clearly defined processes. As tunnels are a constantly changing environment (i.e. the traffic 
volume, density etc.) with constantly changing parameters the management system must be revised 
to maintain the quality. Within the BaT tunnel if new services are rolled out in the Bus Network or 
similarly upon the rail network there may be cause to add to the O&M manual or to change the 
operation or maintenance of the tunnel. It is important to improve on the documentation to ensure 
document control and the ability for information to be available in the case of turnover of staff.  
 
  
Figure 21- Continual improvement of the quality management system (ISO 2006). 
7.1.3.2 AS ISO 10013:2003 
 
AS ISO 10013:2003 relates to the Guidelines for quality management system documentation. The 
standard outlines that it is important to develop a sufficient amount of documentation to ensure the 
quality of effective planning, operations, control and continual improvement. Quality management 
system documentation can relate to the entire or a component of the system, these could relate to the 
nature of the product, processes, contractual requirements, governing organisations and the 
organisation. Outlines are given to assist with documenting of a quality management system.  
(Australia 2003) 
 Maintenance 7.1.4
The tunnel planners, road authorities, owners and other parties/organisations whom are involved 
with the O&M are responsible for the maintenance objectives specific to the tunnel. A typical 
objective for a road tunnel involves ensuring that both the system and equipment within the tunnel 
operate at and achieve the specified level of reliability and durability.  
To achieve the specified maintenance objectives an asset management methodology must be 
specified. Three forms of maintenance are incorporated within tunnel maintenance. The firstly form 
is prevention maintenance which requires planned/routine maintenance activities. This could 
involve cleaning, calibrations, or replacing items that wear and tear. The second method consists of 
corrective maintenance which is the reactive form and results from equipment that is damaged or 
when failure occurs unexpectedly. Finally, major refurbishment and replacement involves major 
upgrades or replacement of structure, system or equipment. It is relatively infrequent and usually 
costly.  
50 
 
7.1.4.1 Maintenance manuals  
Maintenance manuals should specify when action should be taken to complete maintenance duties 
on the tunnel while it is in operation. It should also include, but is not limited to: 
 The intervention level at which maintenance should be carried out  
 The service levels VS the defect  
 Units of measurement for usability of asset elements 
 Frequency of inspection 
 Possible inspection level  
Each specific area which the organisation is responsible for within the O&M will require a 
maintenance manual i.e. for the pavement.  
7.2 TUNNEL EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS  
An emergency within a tunnel is any incident that may result in fatality, injury or damage to the 
structure. An Emergency within a tunnel may involve but is not limited to; 
 Electricity 
 Fire  
 Steam pressure  
 Traffic accidents 
 vehicle breakdown  
 crashes 
 debris on carriageway  
 spills  
 lost loads   
 over-height vehicles  
 external electrical supply failure  
 flood  
When developing emergency response plans, particular attention should be given to human 
behaviour, facility ventilation and fire mitigation (Thompson & et.al 2011). 
  
  Ensuring Safety within Tunnels 7.2.1
To ensure safety within tunnels it is required to have sufficient; 
 Communication between all stake holders 
 Training of Emergency services and operator staff 
 Incident management plans that are readily available to all relevant parties 
It is important to note that tunnels are a constantly changing system. Throughout the lifetime of the 
structure, changes will be seen with characteristics associated with the tunnel (i.e. traffic flow) and 
hence constant review of the risks should be made. As an example traffic volume throughout the 
lifespan of the tunnel will change (often will increase). With significant flow of traffic through the 
structure, improvements need to be made to the systems that are monitoring and analysing. (Beard 
& Carvel 2005) 
 Prescriptive requirements  7.2.2
Design methods have been created over time through experience and historic events. When 
applying the prescriptive requirements the risks involved within the design are not fully understood. 
Upon commissioning of the tunnel the events that occur are better understood within the situation 
and hence may lead to better methods of tunnel design.  (Beard & Cope 2007)  
 Assessing Risk 7.2.3
As noted previously, means of reducing risk can be done via implementation of codes or guidelines 
if available and relevant to the situation. A risk-based approach can be undertaken in conjunction 
with the codes/guidelines. A risk analysis should be conducted prior to tunnel design to ensure all 
major risks within the system are known and can be adequately designed for (AFAC 2001).  
Conducting risk-based approach in analysing the risk of the tunnel poses issues with the best 
methodology of undertaking the assessment. With risk there are a number of categories of risk 
which differ based on the ability to pin point the underlying issue leading to an unsafe environment 
and the certainty of how to solve such a problem.  
Firstly ‘hard’ methodologies pertain to situations where the underlying issue is known and a 
desirable methodology to reduce/eliminate the risk is also known. Methodologies range from ‘hard’ 
all the way through to ‘soft’ methodologies where, the underlying issue of the risk may not be well 
understood. Between these two methodologies is the intermediate methodologies which relate to 
situations where the underlying issue is understood however methodologies of eliminating/reducing 
the risk is unknown and hence a system of trial/error may have to be implemented. (Beard & Carvel 
2005) 
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 Tunnel Fire Safety 7.2.4
As noted earlier the ability to reduce risk is greatest within the planning and design phase of the 
project. Decisions around tunnel fire safety are generally based upon; 
1. Fatality and injury 
2. Property loss 
3. Disruption of operations 
Some basic issues surrounding fire risk within tunnels include, but are not limited to; 
1. Fire risk results from the tunnel system as a whole involving design, operation, emergency 
response, and tunnel use. The system involves both design (traffic volume) and non-design 
(Individuals behaviour) elements 
2. With increasing complexity (multi-modal/decked) and length of tunnels the risks need to be 
identified and dealt with effectively 
3. The dynamic environment associated with tunnels. From the opening of the tunnel 
compared to a stage later within its lifetime the system will undoubtedly be different. 
4. Defining what is acceptable in regards to fire risk 
5. What is an appropriate methodology for fire safety 
6. Life sized experimental tests 
7. Replication is experimental test outcomes 
8. Need to know more about tunnel fire dynamics 
9. Fire suppression systems 
10. Human Behaviour 
It is know that tunnel fire science and engineering needs to be more widely understood. Research in 
the area of tunnel fires is very young and many questions remain unanswered surrounding the topic. 
Some areas of ambiguity that need to be researched into more widely include: 
a) Effective ways of preventing fires occurring in tunnels 
b) Factors effecting tunnel fire size and spread 
c) Types of tunnel fire suppression systems  
d) Human behaviour in relation to tunnel fire emergencies in relation to tunnel operators and 
emergency services   
e) Evacuation systems 
f) Automation of Emergency response 
g) Uncertainty in models which are used as part of fire safety decision-making 
  Fire mitigation 7.2.5
Within Fire mitigation the following factors should be considered; spill control, traffic accidents, 
and tunnel length and lighting.  
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8 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF TUNNEL INCIDENTS 
Although open road accident are more common than tunnel fires, accidents that occur within 
tunnels usually have a greater impact and can result in loss of life, infrastructure damage and can 
lead to greater social impacts. The reason for the greater damage incurred by tunnel accidents is due 
to the confined space, meaning that heat and smoke is trapped within the tunnel leading to structural 
damage and potential loss of life. Due to the nature of tunnels and their unfamiliarity to tunnel 
users, a tunnel fire can be a traumatic experience for all users involved.  
A list of recorded tunnel fire incidents occurring before 2005 can be seen in Appendix 2. It should 
be noted that within   
 Appendix 2 the list will not provide a complete and accurate account of all fires that have occurred 
as many tunnels do no publish fires that occur, and information surrounding tunnel fires is difficult 
to obtain. It should be noted however that within the recorded historic events many of the high 
fatality fire events were caused due to HGV and rail. It was also seen that many of the Bus fires 
were able to be extinguished by the bus driver and the only event that lead to fatalities was due to 
human reaction, where it lead to loss of control by the driver. The effect of many incidences was 
increased by inadequate operations and system control.   
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Appendix 2 will be used as a guide only as the data is incomplete. Rail fires have caused less 
concern as it is thought that road tunnel fires are approximately 20 times more likely to occur. 
Within Europe it was found that only 3% rolling stock accidents involved fires.  (Beard & Cope 
2007) 
With the need to increase the efficiency of transport networks, the emergence of tunnels has 
occurred. Safety within these tunnels is therefore vital in ensuring that the system remains efficient 
and the level of service through the tunnel remains high.  
There is a  (1:20) – (1:25)  ratio on the likelihood of a rail tunnel fire occurring compared to a road 
tunnel fire (Peter 2010). The large number of fires that have occurred within tunnels has caused 
attention towards creating strategies to protect the tunnel users, structural integrity and operations 
(Hu, Huo & Chow 2008). Tunnel fires have played a devastating role in the past and have 
consequently led to extensive investigations into the protection and prevention of fires within 
tunnels. Improvements have been made to modelling fire and hence is allowing for increasingly 
more accurate predictions of fire risks within tunnels.  
  
 8.1 ROAD TUNNELS 
The most common means of fatalities within tunnels has been found to occur due to general traffic 
accidents (refer to Table 9). From Norwegian data an approximation has been made that two thirds 
of the tunnel incidents are related to traffic accidents and the remaining one third was due to tunnel 
fire or dangerous goods accidents. Table 9 below provides a summary of the potential loss of life 
for road tunnel incidents in Oslo. 
Table 9 - Tunnel incident life loss in Oslo (Beard & Cope 2007) 
 
Although the cause of fatalities within tunnels is dominantly common traffic accidents, fire related 
incidents usually have multiple deaths and hence cause concern. When a fire occurs within tunnels, 
they tend to trap both smoke and heat which can become fatal for tunnel users.  
 Statistics of tunnel fires  8.1.1
Beard and Cope, 2007 conducted an study upon international tunnel fires, from 1987 to 2006. 
Forty-nine incidents were recorded within this time involving tunnel fires (refer to Figure 22). It 
should be noted within the following diagrams that HGV stands for ‘Heavy Goods Vehicle’ (Beard 
& Cope 2007).  
 
Figure 22- Significant fires world-wide (1987 - 2006)- not including during construction or terrorism (Beard & Cope 
2007) 
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Tunnel fires have involved a number of different vehicles (refer to Figure 23) including busses, 
HGV, trucks and tankers. It is shown in Figure 23 that tankers carrying ‘dangerous goods’ (such as 
petroleum) are not the only cause of tunnel fires. A majority of the fires are made by HGV (61%) 
and busses (31%). The reason for the higher fatalities is the correlation between fire loading and 
heat release rate (refer to chapter 4.2). 
 
Figure 23 - Fatalities in international tunnel fires from 1987-2006 (specific vehicle types) 
 Findings 8.1.2
It was suggested by Beard and Cope, 2007, that although there have been improvements to the 
information and control system within a tunnel to detect and respond to an incident, there are still 
increasing numbers of road accidents. This could be said to be a result of a number of reasons; 
a) Increasing traffic volume 
b) Increasing transportation of Hazardous goods  
c) Increase kinetic energy due to higher traffic speeds (particularly true on rail) 
d) Increasing length of road tunnels – this has been a trend to reduce Environmental impact 
e) Growing risk of terrorism – in Germany 50% of fires have been thought to have been 
started deliberately (Beard & Cope 2007) 
STUVA had carried out major Fire testing which was validated in Norway and is still valid today; 
a) The flashover (simultaneous ignition of combustible material in close proximity within an 
enclosed area) point will occur within 7-10 minutes of the initial fire beginning   
b) Depending on external conditions the fire duration within the vehicle is subject to alternate 
external conditions and hence could last 30minutes up to a number of hours  
c) Smoke inhalation is a considerable concern due to the high quantities of gas that even small 
fires can cause  
d) In some tunnels visibility was an issue due to the cross section filling with smoke quickly 
after a short period of time 
e) Ceasing fires within tunnels is difficult due to access restrictions and extreme heat radiation 
 f) High fire load has been seen to cause extensive damage to the structure.  
Within tunnels, railway and motorway vehicles cause a fire load of approximately 60-80kg per 
square meter compared to residential building containing a fire load of approximate 30-60kgper 
square meter. This increase in loading is another explanation for increased severity of tunnel fires.   
 Case study - Mont Blanc tunnel fire 8.1.3
The Mont Blanc tunnel fire occurred on the 24
th
 of March 1999. The fire was initiated by a truck 
with a thermal foam trailer containing flour and margarine. There were 38 fatalities and the Fire 
Chief was sent to hospital along with two victims found in a refuge. (AFAC 2001) 
Table 10 - Mont Blanc tunnel characteristics (AFAC 2001) 
Characteristic  
Length 11.6km 
Traffic Bi-directional 
Vehicle rests Located ever 300m 
Safe refuge area At every second rest area 
Extinguisher Every 100m 
Call Point Every 100m 
Fire Brigade personnel hydrants, telephones 
and call points 
Every 150m 
 
This study was chosen to highlight the learnings that came from the event. The learnings from the 
fire consisted of: 
1. The speed and magnitude of the fire that developed within the truck led to the spread of fire 
to other vehicles 
2. Smoke extraction through the ventilation system was limited by capacity 
3. The fire was accelerated due to the a higher supply of air than exhaust 
4. Inadequate equipment (lights, ventilation, no central facility, lack of fire water, fresh air 
ducts to refuge)   
The learnings highlight the importance of the fire load along with the physical system that the fire 
interacts with.  
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8.2 RAIL TUNNELS 
Incidents within rail tunnels had not been clearly documented and hence results in a gap of 
information. However, the greatest rail tunnel incident was believed to be the Armi tunnel in 1944, 
Italy which resulted in 450 fatalities due to carbon monoxide inhalation. As mentioned earlier, 
within Europe studies suggest that rolling stock fire incidents constitute approximately 3% of all 
incidents in rail (Beard & Cope 2007). 
 Statistics of Rail fires 8.2.1
Rail network fire fatality rates, were estimated using data for several countries including 
Scandinavia, UK and France. The indicative results estimated that approximately 0.25 deaths per 
billion persons per km (Beard & Cope 2007).  
 
Figure 24 - Rail tunnel fires world-wide (1987-2006)- (Beard & Cope 2007) 
Figure 24 above shows that there have been approximately 14 major rail fires worldwide with 29% 
of those pertaining to mortality. Although there has only been 4 fatal rail tunnel fires the death rate 
associated with these fire is significant. Figure 24 show the four fatal railway tunnel fires involve a 
total of 254 deaths. Of these 254 deaths, 155 deaths were associated the Kaprun train located in 
Austria.   
 
Figure 25 - Rail tunnel death rate/ locations (1987-2006) (Beard & Cope 2007) 
  Case study - Kaprun Tunnel, Austria, 2000 8.2.2
 
The Kaprun tunnel in Austria is used to pull skiers up and down a mountain to the Kaprun Glacier. 
The tunnel has a 45 degree angle and is 3.2km long. A sketch of the tunnel can be seen in Figure 26.  
On the 12
th
 of November 2000, a train being pulled to the top of the glacier came to a stop 600m 
into the tunnel. The train turned into a raging inferno where the steep tunnel acted as a chimney 
sucking the smoke up. The fire began in the final cabin where people tried to break windows to 
escape; meanwhile the train drive did not know what was happening. As the driver didn’t know of 
the incidence, emergency evacuation couldn’t be carried out effectively and hence lead to poor 
communication to the operation centre along with emergency services. There was 155 death and 12 
survivors for the event. The disaster was thought to be caused be an ill designed heater with 
pressurised hydraulic oil dripping onto the heater element and resulting in flames.  
The lack of safety within the train was encouraged by the will to be competitive with other ski 
resorts. The faulty design and safety cut backs were the main cause of the fire and show the 
important of ensuring safety measures are implemented (BBC 2004).  
This case study was chosen to highlight the importance of sufficient maintenance and the 
importance of communication. The lack of ability of the rail users to communicate with the driver 
resulted in elongated time for realisation which reduced the ability for all users to effectively escape 
and increased the time for emergency services to extinguish the fire.  
The study also highlights the natural ventilation system which was a great example of the chimney 
effect. The smoke egressed from the top of the tunnel and hence the passengers tried to escape in 
the opposite direction.  
 
Figure 26 - Kaprun tunnel fire (BBC 2004) 
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8.3 VEHICLE FIRES 
Vehicle fires have a number of causes for the ignition of fires. These causes comprise of worn 
components, poor workmanship, age or normal deterioration and unsufficient maintenance.  
Buses and coaches fires cause much concern as they carry a large number of people (more than 22 
people) - (Hammarström, Axelsson & Reinicke 2004). The Norwegian and Swedish road authorities 
conducted an investigation into the cause of bus fires. It was found that around 1% of busses caught 
fire per year. There will be variations within the Australian and the Nordic countries bus fire 
statistics due to the variation in the climate, maintenance plans and bus designs and hence the 
statistics will vary across countries. For the purpose of this study the Norwegian and Swedish data 
will be used as it is readily available and sufficiently documented which is not the case for 
Queensland. For completeness of data and for better insight into the occurrence of bus fires a study 
should be undertaken within the Brisbane area to demonstrate the impact it will have upon the 
Busway and how these occurrences can be reduced.   
Table 11 and Table 12 show the fires that have occurred within bus/coaches within Norway and 
Sweden. The causes for many of the fires have been noted to ignite due to the following categories: 
1. Technical fault 
2. Arson  
3. Unknown 
 Table 11- Norwegian bus/coach fires between 2000-2004 (Hammarström, Axelsson & Reinicke 2004) 
 
Table 12 - Swedish bus/coach fires between 2000-2004 (Hammarström, Axelsson & Reinicke 2004) 
 
The causes for the fires in Norway were broken down into the causes of the fires. The technical 
faults were further broken down into four categories; electrical, leakage, unspecified and friction 
(wheel system or breaking system).  The results can be seen below in Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27 - Causes of bus fires between2001-2004 in Norway (Hammarström, Axelsson & Reinicke 2004) 
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8.4 SYDNEY HARBOUR TUNNEL CASE STUDY 
The Sydney harbour tunnel case study was chosen to be discussed within this study as it highlights 
the human behavioural system and how people respond to certain aspects of an emergency response 
system. This study will be used as a guide for human behaviour.  
A study was undertaken in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel to observe the behaviour of 32 volunteer 
(aged 16-81) tunnel users during a controlled fire (burning car) evacuation process. It was noted that 
there was a lot of confusion surrounding the fire incident and the major factor contributing to the 
success of the evacuation was the pre-recorded audio messages played via the radio and over the PA 
(public announcement) system.  
The study highlighted that 94% of the participants based their action on those of others. A group of 
young males was the first to exit their car. It was noted by one participant that;“[I] opened the door 
when I saw the sign above then saw others still in cars so got back in and shut the door”. (Burns et 
al. 2013) 
There were a list of reasons reported pertaining to why the volunteers preferred to follow the actions 
of others including; reassurance, believing others were more knowledgeable and uncertainty about 
how to respond to the situation. It was also noted by the volunteers that in a real scenario they 
would have checked the burning car for occupants. (Burns et al. 2013) 
Another concern that was noted by the participants of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel fire was that they 
were leaving private property in an unfamiliar environment. Hence there was ambiguity around 
leaving their vehicle and keys behind and how they would retrieve their cars. There was also a 
belief that one is safer when in close proximity to their car.  
A more detailed list of events during the case study was documented and can be seen below in 
Table 13.  
 Table 13 - Response times from all cars coming to a halt (Burns et al. 2013) 
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9 ØRESUNDSBRUN 
For emergency response to be efficient it is required to have clear communication between all stake 
holders, training of emergency services and operator staff and incident management plans that are 
readily available to all relevant parties. To ensure all of objectives are met and emergency response 
can be carried out quickly and efficiently it is important to have sound working relationships 
between stakeholders and clearly defined roles.  
The structural design of the BaT tunnel is not a new concept as there is decked tunnels currently 
operating within the world today (refer to Table 14). The concept of incorporating multiple modes 
within a tunnel has also been incorporated within tunnels (refer to Table 14). However 
incorporating a decked, multimodal tunnel which links to underground stations over a length of 
5.4km where public transport is the only users is a new concept for Queensland and within the 
world, hence it is important to draw on past experiences and utilise knowledge and apply it to the 
BaT tunnel.  
One major aspect that will contribute to the success of the BaT tunnel is the operation and 
management of the tunnel. As discussed within Chapter 7.2 there is a relationship between 
operation and maintenance and the success of the Emergency response system. It is therefore 
important to define roles, create relationships and ensure clear communication between stake 
holders. In the past there has been no need to form relationships between Queensland Rail and 
Brisbane Transport as public transport modal change within SEQ has been limited or facilitated by 
Translink.  
Within the BaT tunnel both rail and bus consortiums will need to work together to ensure the 
integrity of the structure, safety of all users and ease of modal changes. The Øresundsbrun is a well-
documented example of sound management and how two countries can work together to maintain 
efficient operations. The Øresundsbrun connects Copenhagen with the southern Sweden city of 
Malmö and hence there is communication between both countries that in the past would not have 
collaborated together. The Øresundsbrun has a lot of information readily available about the 
management of the bridge. It was therefore chosen to investigate the Øresundsbrun’s management 
hierarchy, communication systems and relationships between the states during the event of an 
emergency. 
 
 
 Table 14 - World decked tunnels 
Tunnel Decked Mode/s Country/City 
BaT Yes Bus and Rail Australia –Brisbane 
Øresund No Rail and traffic Denmark & Sweden 
Alaskan Way Yes Motorway USA - Seattle 
SMART Yes Motorway and 
flood mitigation 
Malaysia – Kuala Lumpa 
Orlovski Yes Road Russia 
Al Variante di Valico No - 
Parallel 
Parallel 
Motorway 
Italy 
Chongming Yes Traffic and light 
rail 
China 
Fehmarnbelt No Rail and traffic Denmark & Germany 
A86 Yes Motorway Paris 
Fuxing Road Tunnel 
under the Huangpu 
River 
Yes Motorway China 
9.1 BACKGROUND  
 
Figure 28 - Oresund Bridge 
The Oresund Bridge connects Copenhagen with the southern Sweden city of Malmö (see Figure 28 
- Oresund Bridge). The structure consists of a bridge, an artificial island and a tunnel. Øresundsbro 
Konsortiet is jointly owned by the Danish and Swedish states where A/S Oresund and Svensk-
Danska Broforbindelsen (SVEDAB AB), both own and operate sections of the Oresund Bridge on 
their respective sides. The agreement between the two companies is outlined in a consortium 
agreement that is approved by both governments. (Konsortiet 2005) 
 
Figure 29 - Cross sectional view 
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9.2 MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 
A/S Øresund owns and operates the Øresund motorway. They also own the Øresund rail however 
the operation and maintenance is carried out by Banedanmark (Danish National Railways Agency). 
Banedanmark then pays A/S Øresund a fee for the use of the infrastructure. A/S Øresund owns half 
of the Øresundsbro Konsortiet where Øresundsbro Konsortiet looks after A/S Øresund finances. 
Staff receive contracts through Øresund however they are hired through Sund & Bælt. (Sund&Bælt 
2014) 
 
Sund & Bælt Holdings A/S is responsible for the administration of six subsidiaries. It also acts as 
the operator for A/S Øresund and A/S Storebælt where it also holds administrative responsibilities. 
The responsibility of Sund and Bælt in relation to the Øresund Bridge involves: 
1. Maintenance of the Øresund motorway  
2. Ensuring the collection of fees from Banedanmark (Rail Net Denmark) for user rights to the 
Øresund line on Amager (The Danish Island) 
3. Overseeing the part ownership of Øresundsbro Konsortiet  
4. Managing the repayment of A/S Storebælt's and A/S Øresund's debt portfolios  
A/S Storebælt is the owner of the Storebælt link along with the road and rail joint to it. A/S 
Storebælt ensures the operation and maintenance of the road link and the maintenance of the rail 
link is maintained at an acceptable standard.  
SVEDAB AB is owned by the Swedish government and owns half of the Øresundsbro Konsortiet. 
Both A/S Øresund and SVEDAB AB are responsible for the land care on their respective side of the 
Øresund which is outlined within the consortium agreement. (Konsortiet 2005) 
An overview of the management structure is given below in Figure 30.  
 
  
Figure 30 - Management structure 
From this general overview of the management structure it is seen that a lot of planning has gone 
into defining the roles and ensuring that both the Danish state and Swedish state have joint 
responsibilities for ensuring the integrity of the structure. Both parties jointly own an external 
consortium and outline their responsibilities within the consortium agreement.  
The BaT tunnel should involve an agreement between both the all stake holders which clearly 
outlines the responsibilities of both parties and ensures that in the event of an emergency, sound 
working relationships are established. The BaT tunnel is not working between two states or 
competitors however responsibilities are still required to be established.  
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10 IMPORTANT FINDINGS  
10.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Within the literature review there is a number of key factors that will be extracted and summarised 
for the use within the analysis. Table 15 highlights these elements.  
Table 15 - Important findings within the Literature review 
Chapter Findings 
Fire  Fire involves O2, heat and fuel  
 Tunnel fires are critical as they are confined spaces and hence 
temperatures can reach temperature of 1200 degrees Celsius 
within a few minutes 
 Fires can be classified based on time/temperature curves 
 Rail and Bus tunnels must use the RABT-ZTV (rail) 
time/temperature curve based on AS 4825 – 2011 
 Tunnel fires can be ventilation controlled or fuel controlled 
Tunnel Fire Risk  Prevention and protection methods to reduce risk 
 A big risk is the vehicles traveling within the tunnels 
 Fire safety is a result of tunnel design, tunnel management and 
emergency response 
Tunnel fire safety 
components 
 All tunnels are different. All tunnels are dynamic in nature.  
 Economics plays a major role in justifying the level of safety a 
tunnel will adopt 
 Some major components that contribute to safety within a tunnel 
consists of; the ventilation system, human behaviour, fire 
mitigation, egress times and information and control systems  
Operation and 
Maintenance of road 
tunnels 
 There are many similarities between the operation and 
maintenance that takes place within road tunnels and the BaT 
tunnel 
 Operations includes; normal operations, incident management by 
altered operating conditions and incident response by tunnel 
closure 
 Procedures must allow for feedback to continue to improve the 
system 
 Emergency response must ensure; communication between all 
stake holders, training of Emergency services and operation staff 
and incident management plans that are readily available to all  
 Tunnel fire science is a young area where more research needs to be conducted into the following 
areas: 
a) Effective ways of preventing fires occurring in tunnels 
b) Factors effecting tunnel fire size and spread 
c) Types of tunnel fire suppression systems  
d) Human behaviour in relation to tunnel fire emergencies in relation to tunnel operators and 
emergency services   
e) Evacuation systems 
f) Automation of Emergency response 
g) Uncertainty in models which are used as part of fire safety decision-making 
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10.2 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF TUNNEL INCIDENTS  
Within the data gathering process a number of key findings were extracted and listed within Table 
16 below. 
Table 16 - Important findings from the historical review of tunnel incidents 
Case / topic Findings 
Road tunnels  The higher the fire load the more serious the fire, the typical types of 
vehicles involved with tunnel fires are HGV, Buses and lorries 
 The speed and magnitude of a fire can led to the spread of fire to other 
vehicles 
 Fire can be accelerated due to a higher supply of air than exhaust 
 Inadequate equipment can lead to fires (lights, ventilation, no central 
facility, lack of fire water, fresh air ducts to refuge)   
Rail tunnels   Rail fires occur less but are generally more catastrophic than road tunnel 
fires 
 Communication is a major component involved with the effectiveness in 
an Emergency Response plan 
 The ventilation system and the effectiveness of smoke control plays a 
major role in the direction of egress and the ability for emergency 
services to ingress 
Vehicle Fires  Major causes of bus fires includes; worn components, poor workmanship, 
age or normal deterioration and unsufficient maintenance 
 There is a correlation between the grade of a tunnel and the number of 
fires that occur (increased use of breaking leads to increased number of 
fires) 
Sydney Harbour 
Tunnel 
 94% of the participants based their action on those of others 
 It was also noted by the volunteers that in a real scenario they would have 
checked the burning car for occupants. 
 People are uncomfortable leaving private property in an unfamiliar 
environment 
 Clear instructions and use of the PA system was a major component of 
the success of the system. 
Øresundsbrun  Sound operations depend upon sound relationships and the definition of 
roles 
 Øresundsbrun is a good example of how management of a single asset 
can be managed between two countries 
 An external consortium was established to maintain the cooperation 
between the two states.  
 11 ANALYSIS 
Two scenarios will be analysed using the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) framework which is a 
method that is outlined in Chapter 3 of the study. The RCA will be applied to the BaT design and 
the causes of fatality in relation to the tunnels non-design elements (human behaviour). To 
undertake the analysis first a definition of the scenarios must be made. Publically available 
information will be used to define the layout of the tunnel and practical assumptions will be made in 
the case that insufficient information is available for the design. The outcome of the root cause 
analysis is hoped to outline the potential causes of fatality in the event of a tunnel fire due to non-
design elements. 
There are two areas of tunnel fire safety, prevention and protection. Prevention is known to be 
measures relating to preventing an event occurring, where protection is measures relating to 
reducing the impact when an incident does occur. Within this analysis recommendations will be 
generated in relation to tunnel fire risk protection, hence the fire is assumed to have already begun 
and the analysis will be conducted into the reactions that follows this event. 
11.1 DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Many fire scenarios could occur depending upon the parameters of the fire, characteristics of the 
staff and the tunnel users, layout of the tunnel, ventilation system and the procedures that need to be 
followed. Due to the large number of input parameters the root cause analysis is a good approach to 
looking at the problem however there are limitations to the method which will be discussed within 
chapter 12.2. The Root Cause analysis methodology is able to analyse a series of events and look at 
all possible scenarios, extract common root causes to the problem and finally produce appropriate 
recommendations to decrease the risks involved with tunnel fire human behaviour. Hence within 
this analysis the definition of the following parameters will be defined: 
 Tunnel layout 
 Tunnel management  
 Emergency response 
 Assumptions 11.1.1
The BaT tunnel is a complex system that incorporates both human and functional systems. The 
focus throughout the study will mainly be upon the human system which incorporates both human 
and non-human aspects. The human aspects involve human behaviour and the components of the 
system that the humans interact with. The functional system incorporates all components of the 
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system that have a specific function (such as the ventilation system).  The analysis will be 
conducted into the failure mechanisms associated with the human system and hence further 
simplifications and assumptions will be made about the non-human aspects of the tunnel. 
The BaT tunnel tube will be assumed to be uniform in cross section (as seen in Figure 31) where the 
longest section between the underground stations will be analysed with a grade that is assumed to 
be dictated by the new generation of rolling stock. The analysis of human behaviour will be 
undertaken within two defined scenarios. It will be assumed that the fire has already ignited and the 
analysis will be done upon the behaviour of the tunnel users in reaction to the fire and the risks that 
is imposed by their behaviour which could lead to the potential loss of life.  
To simplify the problem, the tunnel will be broken into compartments where the busway, railway 
and stations are to be analysed as individual entities. The busway and railway are structurally 
separated and only in the case of structural failure would there be carry over effects into the 
alternate modes way. When the fire reaches the stations the smoke and heat is assumed to exit 
through the ventilation outlets ducts. This was assumed to simplify the modelling and as the 
functional system is assumed to be sound, the only uncontrollable variable is the human system.  
The human behavioural components of the busway and railway have minimal impact upon each 
other in the event of a fire as they are structurally isolated. Interaction between the modes and 
public transport users will happen within the stations. The focus of this dissertation is upon tunnel 
fire safety and hence the interaction that occurs within the station is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. However, it is not practical to assume that within reality the entire system operates in 
isolation as the effects of smoke, heat and human interaction would be translated longitudinally 
through the structure and into the stations. Heat would be transferred throughout the structure and 
within the design process assessment should be undertaken into how much heat will transfer 
between the decks and the effects it will have upon the alternate mode during operations. However, 
for the purpose of assessing the non-design system following the event of a fire, the busway and 
railway will be viewed in isolation and hence, it will be analysed separately.    
Within this study the tunnel will only be analysed during incident management altered operation 
conditions and will not consider periods of construction and downtime.  
  
Figure 31 - BaT tunnel conceptual design cross section 
 Design Fire 11.1.2
The busway can be viewed in isolation of the railway tunnel and underground station for the 
purpose of this dissertation. The busway fire poses interesting issues as it has not been analysed 
within previous studies. It is assumed that the fire within the busway occurs upon a bus within the 
engine. The emergency egress exits are 120m apart.   
The Railway fire is assumed to emerge within a coach of the new generation of rolling stock. It is 
assumed that evacuation can take place into the alternate railway tube every 250m where they can 
make safe journey to the nearest exit. 
The parameters for both the busway and railway fire will be assumed to be identical in accordance 
with AS4825-2011. It is assumed that the bus and rail fires will have similar fire loads. Hence the 
variations between the scenarios will be involved with the tunnel design, tunnel management and 
emergency response.   
An extreme fire event will be assumed to follow the RABT-ZTV (train) fire time/temperature curve 
and hence will reach temperatures of approximately 1200 degrees Celsius within 5 minutes of 
ignition (see Figure 32).  
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Figure 32 - RABT-ZTV (rail) time/temperature curve 
 Emergency response procedure  11.1.3
In the event of an emergency all stake holders will be informed following the recognition of the fire 
by the operations team. The stakeholders will include the tunnel staff, Public transport staff, Tunnel 
owners and operators, Emergency response team and the Emergency services.   
The purpose of emergency response will be: 
 Maximise the safety within the tunnel  
 Minimise the time taken to clear incidence  
 Minimise time for emergency services to appear onsite  
 Minimise the risk to emergency services  
 Minimise the time taken to extinguish the fire 
 Minimise potential loss of life 
The emergency response will be incorporated into the information and control (SCADA) system 
and will include; 
1. Lighting 
2. Ventilation system 
3. CCTV 
4. Fire detection system 
5. Fire deluge system 
6. Tele control 
7. Public announcement system 
8. Incident detection system 
9. Communications systems 
10. Traffic control systems 
11. Radio and Wireless 
 Upon design of the tunnel, all stake holders are assumed to have developed the emergency response 
plan. They are assumed to have ran a series of scenarios to train the staff and how they respond to 
the scenario. All personal that take part within the emergency response will have defined roles and 
have sufficient training to deal with many situations. 
 Tunnel Users 11.1.4
The maximum number of passengers on the busway travelling from the south of Brisbane to the 
CBD will increase significantly. Capacity will increase from approximately 10,400 to 23,100 per 
hour (DTMR 2013). The capacity for commuters getting to the CBD from the north will increase 
from 5,200 to approximately 17,900 per hour. The BaT tunnel will ease the bus congestion on the 
Captain Cook Bridge and allow more access for private vehicles. (DTMR 2013) 
 Tunnel layout 11.1.5
The tunnel section that is being investigated will be assumed to be between fire isolated exits. There 
will be a 240m (120m either side of the exit as per AS4825-2011) section for a bus and 500m 
(500m either side of the exit as per AS4825-2011) for the railway. Within the busway it is assumed 
that there will be 16 buses that have to egress through a single exit. The busway will consist of the 
road, services compartment, and a duct ventilation compartment along the crown of the tunnel 
(Figure 31). The railway will be bidirectional which will be separated via a fireproofed wall to 
prevent the effects of Bernoulli (Figure 31). The ventilation system will incorporate jet fans at the 
stations and will suck the smoke towards the stations.  
 
Figure 33 - Busway (left) and railway (right) 
11.2 BUSWAY 
The busway will be viewed in isolation from the railway. The analysis will be done upon the human 
behaviour that occurs following the ignition of a fire within the tunnel (specifications of the fire will 
be described below). The assumptions made within Chapter 11.2 will be made using the standard 
practices for road tunnel operation and maintenance guidelines (as seen in chapter 7). The 
assumptions will also be made in relation to the BaT tunnel preliminary design characteristics seen 
in chapter 2.3.  
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 Busway layout 11.2.1
The tunnel will have bidirectional flow without a division barrier. There is a ventilation duct along 
the crown of the roof (13m
2
). In accordance with AS 4825-2011 there will be 120m between tunnel 
exits. See Figure 33 above.   
 Bus fleet specifications and Busway capacity: 11.2.2
The only vehicles entering the upper deck of the tunnel will be busses. The busses are all assumed 
to be Volvo B10L.  
 
Figure 34- Volvo B10L 
The Volvo B10L has the following characteristics: 
 Capacity: 62 
 Dimensions (m): 12 x 2.48 x 3.3 
 Loaded weight: 20 tonnes 
Within accordance of AS 4825-2011 the tunnel should be designed for degraded operations during 
the worst peak hour scenario (to be conservative degraded operations can be considered to be one 
missed headway for degraded operations). To allow for the root cause analysis it will be assumed 
that there will be 16 buses that need to be evacuated through a single fire exit.    
 Busway operations 11.2.3
In accordance with AS 4825-200 the tunnel will be designed for commuters where the buses are 
driven by staff with training in emergency response.  
The operational times is assumed to be identical to the Brisbane Transport operational times: 
 Monday – Friday 5.00 am – 12.30 am; and  
 Saturday – Sunday 12.00 am – 12.00 am 
The busway operations and maintenance will be responsible for: 
 Communication between all stake holders 
  Training of Emergency services and operator staff 
 Incident management plans that are readily available to all relevant parties 
The emergency response fixed installation will include: 
 Automated detection system  
 Door monitoring 
 Warning signs 
 Pre - recorded PA system 
 Live directed 
 Radio rebroadcast 
 Variable message 
 Continuous monitoring  
 Incident detection 
 Emergency phones 
 Emergency service radios 
 Traffic flow detection 
 Variable message signs 
 Lane use signs 
 Radio broadcasting  
 Control room  
 High reliability control system 
 Fire Isolated exits 
 Fire separation of power source 
 Fire protection of electrical circuits 
The equipment found within the Bus will include: 
 First Aid Kit  
 Fire Extinguisher  
 Two Way Radio  
 Emergency Parking Brake  
 Safety Latch on the Emergency Exits 
 Bus driver training 11.2.4
Bus drivers will be trained and familiar with:  
 Rear Door Evacuation  
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 Side Door Evacuation   
 Split Door Evacuation  
 For a Bus Rolled over 
 Busway egress path 11.2.5
The busway egress path is critical for determining the egress time that could be encountered during 
evacuation. Within the tunnel design passengers must exit though fire isolated exits, once in these 
exits the passengers can egress through the underground stations on the surface.  
Egress time from the busway is made up of realisation, bus evacuation, queue time and tunnel 
evacuation.  
11.3 RAILWAY 
The railway will be viewed in isolation from the busway. Railway fires have occurred throughout 
history where a list of rail fires can be seen within   
 Appendix 2. The main cause of tunnel fires is electrical faults, arcing and friction. This tunnel fire 
will be assumed to begin within a coach.  
 Railway Layout 11.3.1
The railway allows for bidirectional flow and is separated by a fire proof wall. There is a walkway 
that allows for passengers to egress from the train without the need to change levels i.e. a ladder.  
Within the tunnel the following parameters will hold true: 
 Longitudinal ventilation: Jet fans located at the portals and underground stations  
 Door monitoring systems  
 Mobile phone coverage is available 
 Driver radio communication  
 On-board PA 
 Tunnel emergency phones 
 Traffic flow detection 
 Control Room 
 On site incident control room 
 Walkway  
 Illuminated exit signs for way finding 
 Portable extinguished  
 Spalling protection 
 Redundant water supply 
 Booster facility 
 Internal hydrants (ring main) 
 Hydrants at portals 
 Fire protection of power sources and electrical circuits  
 Integrity of anchors and fixings 
 Dual power supply 
 240m between tunnel emergency exits  
 Headway 11.3.2
Rail has requirements for sufficient headway to stop and prevent a collision. The headways are kept 
via the use of sop signals. Refer to Figure 35 for a proposed layout of the headway system. The 
higher the headway between the rolling stock the lower the risk imposed within a tunnel fire event 
and higher the ability to egress.  
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Figure 35 - Rail headway 
 New generation of rolling stock 11.3.3
The new generation of will be six-car trains where an artist’s impression of the train can be seen in 
Figure 36. The BaT tunnel will be designed for use by the NGR.  
 
Figure 36 – NGR (DTMR 2013) 
The operating hours of the railway will be the same as that of the busway: 
 Monday – Friday 5.00 am – 12.30 am; and  
 Saturday – Sunday 12.00 am – 12.00 am 
 Egress path  11.3.4
When egressing from the train there will be a pathway that the commuters can use. There will be 
250m between fire isolated doors. These doors will open into the alternate rail section where the 
passengers can then egress along the length of the tunnel into the stations and out onto the ground 
surface.  
11.4 BUSWAY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS  
Casual factor charting is a process of listing the sequence of events and creating a skeleton chart to 
display the results that could lead up to a failure. The process used to identify causes of fatality will 
be the Root Cause analysis which is described in section 3.1. This will be applied to the fire 
scenario described in chapter 11.2 in relation to the human system within the busway and how the 
sequence of events could occur from the moment of fire ignition through to fatality. Following the 
casual factor charting, the casual factors will be extracted. Casual factors are defined as events that 
if removed it would lead to a reduced event or would eliminate the entire event. Following the 
 identification of the casual factors the root causes of these will be found using a flow chart and 
finally recommendations will be given and displayed in a table format.  
To simplify the ability to carry out the casual factor charting process the fire has been sectioned into 
two distinct phases; Recognition and Response. The recognition phase will describe the events 
occurring between ignition and the beginning of lead up to the response plan. The response phase 
will highlight the sequence of events that take place after the emergency services have been notified 
and the emergency response team begin responding to the problem. Following the casual factor 
charting the casual factors will be extracted and explained.  
The casual factor charting was undertaken for the busway and is displayed in Appendix 3. The 
casual factor charting process begins with a fire occurring in the busway; the potential reactions 
following the fire ignition will be documented and explained.  
Following the ignition of a fire within the Bus and Train tunnel it is assumed that busses will 
continue to enter the tunnel until the approaching bus drivers are aware of the situation through 
communication or ability to sight the fire themselves. There are two scenarios which were analysed 
within the recognition phase. The two scenarios chosen are based upon historic events and 
technological capabilities and can be seen in Figure 37. Following the description of the two 
scenarios, a description will be given into the human behaviours that occur within the response 
stage.   
The first scenario will be defined by the recognition of the fire by the bus driver where the second 
scenario is defined by the bus driver not initially recognising the fire.  
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Figure 37 - Scenario 1 & 2 
 Scenario 1 11.4.1
The first scenario involves the fire initially being noticed by the bus driver. This situation assumes 
that the bus is the first to know about the fires occurrence and has the following possibilities;  
1. The bus fire is extinguished 
2. Control centre is notified/notices fire 
3. The fire quickly becomes uncontrollable/the fire is not controlled in sufficient time while 
evacuation begins.  
The bus fire could be quickly extinguished if the bus driver has sufficient training or is aware of the 
situation or alternately if there is a commuter who has good situational awareness or experience. If 
the fire isn’t extinguished quickly then it could get out of control. In the event of the fire becoming 
out of control there is a possibility of the bus doors becoming jammed or becoming blocked by the 
fire (has been seen to occur within historic events). The jamming/blocking of the door would lead to 
panic and use of alternate evacuation points. The inability to escape could lead to potential loss of 
life. When the control centre is notified (by a bus driver) or they notice the fire by use of their 
information and control system, they can begin the emergency response procedures. The more 
thorough the operators training and understanding of the procedure, the faster the actions can be 
carried out to ensure tunnel users are in a place of safety before conditions worsen.  
 Following the evacuation of the bus which is on fire the surrounding buses are assumed to realise 
the severity of the situation and either the bus driver instructs the passengers to evacuate the tunnel 
in an orderly manner of people begin to self-evacuate. The evacuation process risk increases as the 
time to begin evacuation increases. As there are many combustible engines and petroleum fuel 
tanks it is critical to evacuate all personal as soon as possible.  
The casual factors that can be extracted from scenario 1 are; 
1. The fire becoming uncontrollable  
2. Doors blocked  
 Scenario 2 11.4.2
In the case that the fire is not noticed by the bus driver, there is a possibility the following bus will 
notice the fire, passengers will notice the fire or the operation centre will first notice the event.  
In the case that the following bus notices the fire they could notify the ignited bus driver along with 
the control centre. While notifying the driver they could simultaneously stop the bus and begin 
evacuation of the passengers through the fire isolated exits. In the event that the bus driver does not 
have proper training into how to deal with the situation, the following bus could stop or continue to 
follow the bus that is ignited without notifying anyone, in the hope that the ignited bus would 
notice.  Once the Bus driver in the ignited bus was aware of the situation they could come to a halt 
and extinguish the fire using the on board, portable fire extinguisher.  
If the passengers were the first to notice the bus fire it is possible that panic would occur. This panic 
could lead to erratic behaviour where passengers try to escape from a moving bus through the 
emergency exits such as the Huguenot tunnel, South Africa 1994 see   
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Appendix 2. This could have carryover effects to oncoming busway traffic and could lead to 
worsening the situation (e.g. a busway crash). Alternatively the passengers could simply notify the 
bus driver whom could stop and extinguish the fire, or in the event that the fire is already out of 
control the emergency response procedure could be carried out.  
If the control centre was the first to notice the fire/smoke being emitted from the bus through the 
use of CCTV or the fire detection system, they could immediately notify the bus driver and 
simultaneously begin the emergency response procedure.  
The Casual factors from scenario 2 consist of: 
1. Bus following an ignited bus  
2. Control centre not notifying the relevant stake holders 
3. The fire detection system not working 
4. Panic by the tunnel users or staff 
     Following the Emergency response procedure 11.4.3
Prior to emergency response, there is a lead up of events that is described in scenario one and two. 
A general observation can be made that the longer the time taken for the operation centre to notice a 
fire the longer will be the egress time for tunnel users and higher the risk.  
Once the emergency response plan has been put into place there is again many choices and 
sequences that could occur.  Emergency response arrival time, and efficiency of tunnel user egress, 
is based on the time that is taken for the operation centre to notice the fire and enter into the 
emergency response plan. The tunnel users can behave in different ways when the alarms, way 
finders and pre-recorded public announcement system are activated. The tunnel users can choose to 
ignore the automated system and check for survivors in the bus as the Sydney harbour tunnel case 
study revealed was a likely outcome within a real fire. The tunnel users might not follow the 
instructions as they are confused due to unclear instructions, or they might be experiencing the site 
effects of the smoke and heat from the fire and unable to make good decisions. In response to the 
passengers being confused or affected by smoke, they could receive instructions from the bus 
drivers on the ways to evacuate or they could follow the crowd which is already egressing towards 
the fire isolated exits. Depending on the awareness, location and characteristics of the individual the 
individual can also follow the procedures promptly and egress quickly. In some cases the tunnel 
users may have already egressed before the emergency response procedures has been carried out. 
When users reach the exit they may experience ease of egress and be able to exit promptly, they 
may experience queuing where people have filled the fire isolated tunnels and must wait to enter the 
 tunnel, during the time that the user takes to get from the evacuated bus to the fire isolated exits the 
user may experience problems with vision and lack of oxygen.  
When the emergency services is notified of the fire, depending on their location at time of 
notification they can arrive on site quickly or in an elongated period of time. Depending on the 
characteristics of the fire (ventilation controlled or fuel controlled) the time taken for emergency 
service to reach the site may inhibit the ability for the fire brigade to extinguish the fire. The tunnel 
operators must ensure that the tunnel operations do not fuel the fire and hinder the operations by the 
emergency services.    
The casual factors that can be extracted within the response phase include; 
1. Ignore signals  
2. Elongated arrival time for emergency response 
 
Figure 38 - Response phase 
 Busway Root Causes 11.4.4
Following the completion of casual factor charting, the casual factors can be extracted and the 
underlying root causes can be explored. They are considered to be the cause of potential human 
decisions that result in fatality within the BaT tunnel. The means of fatality within the busway are: 
 Death due to Heat exposure 
 Death due to smoke Inhalation  
 Death due to Trampling  
The casual factors that were highlighted within the casual factor charting were: 
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1. The fire becoming uncontrollable  
2. Doors blocked  
3. Bus following an ignited bus  
4. Control centre not notifying the relevant stake holders 
5. The fire detection system not working 
6. Panic by the tunnel users or staff 
7. Ignore signals  
8. Elongated arrival time for emergency response 
The fire becoming uncontrollable is the first casual factor that was identified. The process flow of 
the root causes are identifying in Figure 39. The root causes of the fire becoming uncontrollable can 
be related back to human behaviour. These Root cases consist of: 
1. Insufficient training  
2. Forget training 
3. Insufficient maintenance  
4. Information and control system error  
5. Lack of communication 
6. Insufficient fire identification technology 
 
Figure 39 – Busway casual Factor 1 - Fire becomes uncontrollable 
To mitigate the fire becoming out of control a number of recommendations can be implemented. 
Firstly the insufficient training involved with authority figures can be improved through re-
examining the training program and ensuring that sufficient training material and programmes are 
provided. Feedback should be gathered from all members that participate within the training and 
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 appropriately acted upon. The fire safety officer should be responsible for liaison between tunnel 
staff/bus drivers and ensuring they are comfortable with procedures in the event of a fire. To ensure 
that the training is not forgotten it is recommended to produce material that can be kept by the 
individual and revised when needed, it is also important to have regular training to ensure that new 
processes are implemented sufficiently and information is not forgotten over time. It is important to 
produce flowcharts of the steps involved within emergency response for reference during the event 
of an emergency; these flowcharts should be kept in accessible places by all staff.  
Insufficient maintenance can be due to personality, insufficient training and/or insufficient 
maintenance plans. The maintenance plans should be revised to ensure that there is sufficient 
documentation surrounding: 
 The intervention level at which maintenance should be carried out  
 The service levels VS the defect  
 Units of measurement for usability of asset elements 
 Frequency of inspections 
 Possible inspection level  
 Ability to revise the maintenance plans 
The maintenance history should be sufficiently documented to ensure that there is not failure of the 
system upon change in staff and to ensure the maintenance plan is followed. Documentation is also 
important in recognising failure patterns. The maintenance can be carried out by contractors and 
hence there is the ability to check their standard of work. In the case that the maintenance is carried 
out by a tunnel staff member, there should be cross checking to ensure all duties are done to a 
correct standard.  
Lack of communication between the operation centre and the bus driver during the event of a fire 
can cause the fire to become out of control. The communications process should be reinforced 
during training and the relevant stake holders position needs to be defined. To simplify 
communications a generic number could be provided for all to contact in the event of a fire where 
the staff member on the receiving end would be required to make relevant communication to all 
parties.  
Fire Identification technology should be located in places that ensure fires are identified and the 
least cost is spent on the technology systems. There is a level of accepted risk with all pieces of 
infrastructure and hence it is important to plan the relevant safety level.  
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Another casual factor that contributes to fatalities within tunnel fires is the blockage of doors. The 
flow of root causes and the lead up to a door blockage can be seen in Figure 40. The root causes 
were attributed to the following reasons: 
1. Personality 
2. Lack of training  
3. Fire characteristics 
 
Figure 40- Busway casual Factor 2 - Door Blockage 
Door blockage can be mitigated through ensuring quality staff are hired to carry out maintenance 
duties and that they are carried out in accordance with the maintenance plan. The staff should be 
trained in the use of portable extinguishes to try and prevent the fire getting to a stage that the 
system will fail.  
Following an ignited bus is a casual factor that contributes to fatality in the event of a tunnel fire as 
there is an increased risk with the production of heat and smoke. The root causes of this action can 
be seen in the schematic within Figure 41. The root causes consist of: 
1. Poor vision 
2. Lack of training in fire science 
3. Lack of training in emergency prevention  
4. Distractions 
 
Figure 41 - Busway casual factor 3 - Following an ignited bus 
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 To reduce the likelihood of not noticing a fire, bus staff would be recommended to take a medical 
assessment prior to employment and effective treatment implemented. It should be ensured that 
adequate training is implemented and bus drivers take regular breaks to ensure concentration.      
When Control centre do not notify the relevant stake holders, there is the possibility of the potential 
loss of life. The logic of the root causes can be followed within Figure 42 and consist of: 
1. New staff 
2. Sick staff 
3. Personality 
4. No updates to procedures  
  
 
Figure 42 - Busway casual factor 4 - Control centre not notifying the relevant stakeholders 
There should be adequate staff to ensure that new staff is not left in control. To get to positions that 
require experience there should be a progression plan and relevant experience will be required. 
Psychometric testing should be undertaken to ensure the staff are capable of fulfilling the duties 
required.  
The failure of the fire detection system is a casual factor the attributes to the potential loss of life. 
The root causes can be defined within Figure 43 and consist of: 
1. Lack of attention to detail 
2. Not aware of maintenance problem 
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Figure 43 - Busway casual Factor 5 - Failure of fire detection system 
As discussed above the maintenance should be adequate to ensure the efficient functioning of the 
tunnel and within this instance prevents the failure of the fire detection system.  
Panic by tunnel users and staff can cause fatality within a tunnel fire. The root cause sequence of 
events is seen within Figure 44. The underlying causes of the panic can consist of: 
1. Personality 
2. Unclear instructions 
3. Lack of education and training 
 
Figure 44 - Busway casual Factor 6 - Panic by tunnel users and staff 
Panic can be mitigated against by effective training to ensure that those involved understand the 
procedures to follow and ensure they are comfortable with procedures. The bus drivers will be 
responsible to the egress of the bus users and instructing them to follow the procedures which is 
hoped to reduce panic. There is a risk of unclear instructions which can be reduced through practice.  
Another casual factor that leads to fatality is ignoring the alarm system. The root causes of ignoring 
an alarm system are highlighted within Figure 45. These root causes consist of: 
1. Unclear instructions 
2. Lack of training or education 
3. Check for survivors  
4. Unclear communication  
5. Language barrier 
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Figure 45 - Busway casual factor 7 - Ignore alarm system 
To prevent alarms being ignored there must be influence upon their personality and a reduction in 
the confusion encountered during the time of egress. To increase the situational awareness of the 
tunnel users and to increase the chances of response educational campaigns can be rolled out to 
educate the public about the importance of egress. The effects of unclear communication and 
language barriers can be reduced through the use of internationally recognised signs and hand 
gestures. 
The final casual factor that contributes to fatality within the busway is the Elongated arrival time for 
emergency response. The logic behind this cause is explained within Figure 46. The root causes 
consist of: 
1. Time to notify Emergency services 
2. Bus continuing to enter the busway  
3. Smoke 
4. Location 
 
Figure 46 – Busway casual factor 8 - Elongated arrival time for emergency response 
To reduce the time taken to notify the appropriate stakeholders the communication system should 
poses a degree of automation. The emergency response plan should be carried out as soon as 
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possible. The location of the fire cannot be controlled however for effective entry the emergency 
response needs to be fully updated on the characteristics of the tunnel fire which requires effective 
communication. To allow for effective communication to the emergency response team a 
relationship should be formed between representatives of the emergency services and the operation 
staff. 
To ensure that all casual factors have recommendations associated with them the following layout 
in Table 17 will be followed to display the results.   
 Table 17- Summary of results for the busways Root cause analysis 
Casual Factor Paths through root cause maps Recommendations 
Fire becomes 
uncontrollable  
1. Insufficient training/ Forget 
training 
2. Insufficient maintenance 
3. Information and control 
system error 
4. Insufficient fire 
identification technology 
5. Lack of communication 
1. To improve training and the ability for staff to remember the training, the training program should be revised 
regularly 
2. Insufficient maintenance can be a result of insufficient training or personality and should incorporate well 
developed training programmes, goods and services management plan, and the ability to supervise the work of 
the maintenance staff 
3. Information and control systems should include careful consideration of the placement of installations and a 
backup/redundancy system. The ability to alert humans in the event of a system are not operating at its full 
potential should be developed into the system. 
4. The tunnel should have sufficient fire detection technology and develop an asset replacement schedule. The 
fire detection technology should be placed in areas that are prone to bus fires i.e. at the bottom of a gradient 
and so that there is ability to sense fires throughout the fire.   
5. To ensure the communication process is more reliable, the alert system should be automated in addition to 
manual communication. There should be well defined definitions of roles, accessibility of all staff to 
information on who to contact in the event. There should also be requirements of relationship development 
within job descriptions i.e. develop relationships with the fire brigade.  
Door Blockage 1. Personality 
2. Lack of training  
3. Fire characteristics 
1. Flow charts of what to do in the event of a fire should be provided within the bus 
2. Signs within a bus and within the tunnel should clearly indicate the location of firefighting equipment.  
3. Bus drivers condition of use should be the ability to effectively extinguish fires with portable extinguishers 
4. Bus driver trained with the ability to lead bus users through alternate exits   
Following an ignited 
bus 
1. Poor vision 
2. Lack of training in fire 
science 
3. Lack of training in 
emergency prevention  
4. Distractions 
 
1. A health test - involving eye site tests - should be completed prior to being hired as a bus staff member to 
ensure the driver is capable of seeing 
2. The training should include information about fire and its effect upon tunnels, the places fires commonly occur 
and the ability to communicate the problem to bus drivers should be provided both as take home material and 
during face-to-face training.  
3. Regular breaks should be taken to ensure the drivers can concentrate  
Operation centre not 
notifying the relevant 
stake holders 
1. New staff 
2. Sick staff 
3. Personality 
4. No updates to procedures  
 
1. New staff will be required to undergo sufficient training before work commences. Depending upon the positing 
– a cross over period may be required.  
2. It is important to have sufficient staff to fill in for those whom are sick 
3. It is important to have continuous updates in procedures to ensure all changes are documented including the 
changeover of staff  
4. Must  reinforce the importance of communication during operation  
Failure of fire 
detection system 
1. Lack of attention to detail 
2. Not aware of maintenance 
problem 
 
1. Reinforce the importance of attention to detail during training  
2. Ensure scheduled monitoring and maintenance that follows a maintenance plan to ensure the integrity of the 
fittings within the tunnel   
Panic by fire users and 
staff 
1. Personality 
2. Unclear instructions 
3. Lack of education and 
training 
 
1. Provide training to the staff to deliver messages in a clear and concise manor to ensure the staff feel 
comfortable in delivering the messages and to ensure the tunnel users are comfortable about being ‘looked 
after’.   
2. Provide advertising for the effects of tunnel fires within the BaT tunnel and highlight the importance of 
following instructions in a calm and orderly manner. 
Ignore alarm system 1. Unclear instructions 
2. Lack of training or 
education 
3. Check for survivors  
4. Unclear communication  
5. Language barrier 
6. Age/health 
7. Smoke exposure  
1. Pre-record and test the public announcement system to ensure it is audible and will be heard over the voices of 
people. While testing ensure the message that is being delivered is clear. 
2.  Provide advertising for the effects of tunnel fires within the BaT tunnel and highlight the importance of quick 
egress 
3. Ensure training is given to the Bus drivers and staff with examples on what to say during an emergency 
4. Ensure internationally recognised signs are used within the bus and train to ensure deaf and international tunnel 
users can understand.  Where appropriate hand signals may be used.  
5. Staff should encourage tunnel users to assist those whom are not capable of self-egress 
6. Egress as quickly as possible. Ensure adequate training of the ventilation control staff to ensure they do not 
make the problem worse. 
Elongated arrival time 
for emergency 
response 
1. Time to notify Emergency 
services 
2. Bus continuing to enter the 
busway  
3. Smoke 
1. Ensure training is undertaken and the idea of effective communication is reinforced 
2. Training staff to look for signs and how to react to them. Consider the use of measures such as seen in Figure 
17 - Sydney Harbour Bridge stop signals (Burns et al. 2013) 
3. Ensure adequate training of the ventilation control staff to ensure they do not make the problem worse. 
 11.5 RAILWAY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
The Root Cause analysis for the railway tunnel fire will be conducted in the same process as seen in 
the busway analysis (section 11.4). The RCA will consist of casual factor charting, root cause 
identification and the producing recommendations.  
Casual factor charting is a process of listing the sequence of events that could lead up to a failure. 
This process will be carried out for the fire scenario described in section 11.1 in relation to human 
behaviour and how the sequence of events could occur within the rail tunnel. Following the casual 
factor charting, the root causes will be extracted. The root causes will be considered to be the cause 
of a decision made which lead to the potential loss of life.   
The casual factor charting was undertaken for the railway and is displayed in Appendix 4. The 
process begins with a fire occurring in the busway; the potential reactions following the fire ignition 
will be documented and explained. There are two stages that occur within tunnel fires which consist 
of recognition and response. Both of these phases will be analysed and recommendations will be 
given for both scenarios.  
 Casual factor charting 11.5.1
The phases involved with tunnel fire response include recognition and response phases. These 
phases will be documented and displayed within Appendix 4. 
Initially a fire begins within a cabin of the train. Two outcomes could pertain from such an event; 
the operation centre notices the fire or alternatively the operation centre does not notice the fire.  
In the event that the operation centre does notice the fire the following sequence of events could 
occur. The operation centre notifies the train driver, begins the emergency response plan or the 
operation centre do not/cannot notify the train driver of the fire. When the operation centre notifies 
the train driver it is expected that he will notify the passengers via the public announcement system 
and begin to stop the train for passengers to egress. There is however, the possibility of the train 
driver not notifying the passengers causing the passengers to panic and try to change between the 
trains cabins or attempt to escape via breaking the glass.  
If the operation centre was not able to contact the train driver or there was a break down in the 
communication process, the passengers or train driver may notice the fire. In the case the 
passengers notice the fire first there may not be sufficient means of communicating with the train 
driver and hence they may have to self-egress.  
 Once the emergency response plan and evacuation process has begun the passengers can experience 
the blockage of doors or the effects of smoke. In both cases staff members can assist with egress. In 
the event that the passengers are trapped within the cabin there is a need to egress an alternate was 
and some may begin to break the windows. Once the passengers have escaped they may experience 
confusion as to what should happen. However as there is large numbers of passengers it is likely 
that those that are confused will follow the crowd or follow the instructions given by the train staff 
members.  
The emergency services must enter the tunnel to fight fires and provide aid to those who require it 
(i.e. those who suffer from smoke inhalation). The ability to ingress significantly impacts the time 
in which emergency services can reach the site and help to extinguish the growing fire.  
When the operation centre does not notice the fire there is the possibility that either the passengers 
will notice the fire or the drive notices. This will then follow the sequence of events describes 
before. See Appendix 4for more detail.  
The casual factors from the chart consist of: 
1. Breakdown in communication  
2. Door blockage 
3. Passengers do not want to egress 
4. Smoke  
5. Arrival time for Emergency response 
It can be noticed that the railway fire has less variables associated with the egress and less casual 
factor associated with the process.  
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 Root Cause identification 11.5.2
The first casual factor that will be discussed is the breakdown of communication. The logic behind 
the identification of the root causes is seen in Figure 47. The root causes identify as: 
1. New staff 
2. Poor training  
3. Fire characteristics 
4. Location  
 
Figure 47- Railway casual factor 1 - Root cause identification 
Following the identification of the root causes that result in a breakdown in communication, 
recommendations must be made to ensure the effects of new staff, poor training, fire characteristics 
and the location of the fire will be reduced. Just as the busway root cause analysis suggests, there 
must be sufficient training of new staff to ensure they comfortably and competently practices and 
carry out the tasks associated with the particular role. In some cases where much knowledge is 
needed a position may need to be filled from existing staff members. As fire characteristics could 
lead to the cause of communication failure, there is need to have back-up methods of 
communication, this could be inclusive of mobile phone, hand-held two way radio etc.  
The second casual factor that will be discussed, which leads to the potential loss of life within the 
railway, is door blockage. This casual factor is similar to the occurrence within a bus fire. The logic 
behind the identification of the root causes is seen in Figure 48. The root causes were identified to 
be: 
1. Personality  
2. Lack of training  
3. Fire characteristics  
4. Inability to extinguish the fire  
5. Fuel is added to the fire  
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Figure 48 – Railway casual factor 2 - Door Blockage 
Recommendations to reduce the effects of door blockage upon potential loss of life will be similar 
to that suggested within the busway root cause analysis. Hence, door blockage can be mitigated 
through ensuring quality staff are hired to carry out maintenance duties and that they are carried out 
in a timely manner in accordance with the maintenance plan. The staff should be trained in the use 
of portable extinguishes to try and prevent the fire getting to a stage that the system will fail.  
The third casual factor that will be discussed is the passengers whom are unwilling to egress. This 
may be due to a number of reasons which are identified within Figure 49. The root causes were 
identified to be: 
 Attachment to material objects 
 Suicide 
 Lack of education in fire science  
 Lack of understanding of the question 
 
Figure 49 - Railway casual factor 3 - Passengers unwilling to egress 
The unwillingness of passengers to egress can lead to fatality and hence a number of 
recommendations were generated to reduce this risk. Educating the public in the form of 
advertisements, posters and films about the severity of a tunnel fire situation along with informing 
about the effects of taking large personal items through to egress (refer to chapter 6.3.1.2). Staff 
should be trained in the ability to deal with suicide patients. 
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The fourth casual factor that pertains to fatality within the railway is the consequence of becoming 
effected by the smoke. This may be due to a number of reasons which are identified within Figure 
50. The root causes were identified to be: 
 Confined space within poor ventilation 
 Unable to egress from train cabin 
 Health/age 
 
Figure 50 - Railway casual factor 4 - Affected by smoke 
The main ability to reduce the effects of smoke lies within the time to egress and the ability of the 
ventilation staff to exhaust the smoke. Therefore it is important for the ventilation control staff to 
have a thorough understanding of the effects of fire and smoke. It is therefore important to have 
many simulations run for many different scenarios within finite element modelling.  
The fifth and final casual factor that pertains to fatality within the railway is the consequence of 
elongated time for emergency response. This may be due to a number of reasons which are 
identified within Figure 51. The root causes were identified to be: 
 Time to notify the emergency response 
 Mode of transport used to ingress  
 Smoke  
 Safety of the emergency response team 
 
Figure 51 - Railway casual factor 5 - Elongated arrival time for emergency response 
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 The ability to reduce the impacts of the elongated arrival time for the emergency services is related 
to both the communication and the location of the tunnel fire. The factors the can pertain to fatality 
within the event of a tunnel fire will involve the time taken to notify the emergency response team, 
the mode of transport used to ingress, the smoke that will be present upon arrival and  the safety of 
the emergency response team. The effects can be reduced through effective education and training 
of the rail drivers, operational staff, ventilation controls staff and the emergency response team. 
This will allow for higher capabilities of the authority figures to communicate and control the 
tunnel fire (within reason) to allow for effective ingress of the emergency services 
To ensure that all casual factors have recommendations associated with them the following layout 
in Table 18 will be followed to display the results.   
 Table 18 - Summary of results for Railway root cause analysis 
Casual Factor Paths through root cause 
maps 
Recommendations 
Breakdown in 
communication   
1. New staff 
2. Poor training  
3. Fire characteristics 
4. Location  
 
1. New staff will be required to undergo sufficient training before work commences. Depending upon the 
positing – a cross over period may be required.  
2. It is important to have sufficient staff to fill in for those whom are sick 
3. It is important to have continuous updates in procedures to ensure all changes are documented 
including the changeover of staff  
4. Must  reinforce the importance of communication during operation 
Door Blockage 1. Personality  
2. Lack of training  
3. Fire characteristics  
4. Inability to extinguish the 
fire  
5. Fuel is added to the fire  
1. Flow charts of what to do in the event of a fire should be provided within the bus 
2. Signs within a bus and within the tunnel should clearly indicate the location of firefighting equipment.  
3. Bus drivers condition of use should be the ability to effectively extinguish fires with portable 
extinguishers 
4. Bus driver trained with the ability to lead bus users through alternate exits   
Passengers unwilling 
to egress 
1. Attachment to material 
objects 
2. Suicide 
3. Lack of education in fire 
science  
4. Lack of understanding of 
the question 
 
1. Educational campaigns to provide information to the public about; the severity of a tunnel 
fire, the risk associated with evacuating along with large material items (i.e. luggage)  
2.  Staff should be trained in the ability to deal with suicide patients. 
 
Affected by smoke 1. Confined space within 
poor ventilation 
2. Unable to egress from 
train cabin 
3. Health/age 
 
1. The ventilation control staff needs to have a thorough understanding of the effects of fire and 
smoke.  
2. Adequate simulations must be analysed in appropriate modelling software for many different 
fire designs to ensure the effects of smoke throughout the tunnel is understood. 
 
Elongated arrival time 
for emergency 
response 
4. Time to notify Emergency 
services 
5. Bus continuing to enter 
the busway  
6. Smoke 
1. Ensure training is undertaken and the idea of effective communication is reinforced 
2. Training staff to look for signs and how to react to them. Consider the use of measures such as seen in 
Figure 17 - Sydney Harbour Bridge stop signals (Burns et al. 2013) 
3. Ensure adequate training of the ventilation control staff to ensure they do not make the problem worse. 
 12 DISCUSSION 
This dissertation was conducted to develop an analysis of human behaviour which can cause 
fatalities within the Bus and Train Tunnel during a tunnel fire event. The purpose was to generate 
recommendations about the Bus and Train tunnels operations and design where applicable. Prior to 
the analysis the structural design was assumed to be sound, which allowed the analysis to be 
concentrated upon the human behavioural aspect when faced with a tunnel fire.  The results 
generated from the analysis conducted within chapter 11, will be discussed in detail below. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the limitations within the study, and finally recommendations of 
future work will be made.  
Prior to conducting the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) assumptions were made about the design fire, 
operations, and egress paths to give context and allow for effective analysis. The assumptions were 
based on Austroads operation and maintenance guidelines for road tunnels, the prescriptive tunnel 
standards AS4825-2011 and the documented, publically available information surrounding the BaT 
tunnel conceptual design. As the design information was assumed, it is not practicable to assume 
that the results can be directly applicable to the BaT tunnel design however from this study an 
indicative result was obtained.  
12.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
Within history, buses have caused tunnel fires which have contributed to fatalities (review chapter 
8.1). The cause of the bus fires is generally due to maintenance issues; hence the fires regularly 
begin within the engine and gearbox. It was clear from the analysis of the busway in chapter 11.4 
that there are many factors that impact the potential loss of life. There is a difference between 
general road tunnels and the BaT tunnels busway in the mode of transport that is used within. The 
busway is used by bus-only mode of transport whereas the vehicles within road tunnels vary from 
dangerous goods vehicles through to poorly maintained personal cars. As the only vehicle entering 
the busway will be buses, there is ability for the public to be influenced by the bus driver and hence 
reduces the unpredictability associated with human behaviour in tunnel fires. However, the busway 
will be used by larger vehicles which have larger fire loads than road tunnels and also have a more 
densely populated tunnel due to the number of public transport users. The casual factors within the 
analysis were found to be: 
1. The fire becoming uncontrollable  
2. Doors blocked  
3. Bus following an ignited bus  
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4. Control centre not notifying the relevant stake holders 
5. The fire detection system not working 
6. Panic by the tunnel users or staff 
7. Ignore signals  
8. Elongated arrival time for emergency response 
These casual factors were then further analysed through a root cause analysis where the four main 
root causes were summarised and identified to consist of; communication breakdowns, slow 
reaction times, insufficient understanding and insufficient maintenance.  
Within this study it has been highlighted that rail tunnel fires are less common than road tunnel 
fires, however the results are often far more devastating due to the large number of people in a 
small place and in some cases the inability to contact the train drive (such as the kaprun tunnel fire, 
Austria 2000). Within the BaT tunnels railway it was noticed that the critical factors that pertain to 
fatalities was similar to the busways causes of fatality. The results for the railway root cause 
analysis was summarised within Table 18. The summarised and identified root causes were found to 
consist of; communication breakdowns, slow reaction times, insufficient understanding and 
insufficient maintenance.  
As the root causes are identical for both the busway and the railway, each component will be 
explained and the differences between the two modal sections of the BaT tunnel explained. 
Firstly, communication is vital for the effective implementation of any procedure. Any breakdown 
in communication will lead to inefficiencies within the human system which then lead to higher 
risk, especially when operating in emergency response stages. The busway and railway can have 
breakdown in communication between the public, drivers, operating staff, stake holders, and 
Emergency services. A lack of communication can lead to confusion, panic and in some cases 
fatality. Examples of the impact of the breakdown in communication consists of the Kaprun rail 
tunnel fire in Austria, 2000 caused the death of 155 users due to the inability of tunnel users to 
communicate with the driver along with slow reaction times by the driver. To provide better 
communication it is recommended that redundancy is built into the system by providing multiple 
means of communication. It is recommended to have clearly defined management structure, clearly 
defined roles and the ability to access information on who to contact easily. The Øresundsbrun is an 
asset that is owned by both the Danish and Swedish government, which facilitates multimodal 
transport. The management structure is set up with clearly defined roles, with an external 
consortium that manages the finances for both states. It is recommended that the BaT tunnel 
develops a detailed management plan that allows all of stake holders to agree and maintain the 
integrity of the structure. Communication also plays an integral role with maintenance as it is 
 important to document and communicate the need for maintenance to the correct authority figures. 
It is important to have ease of flow throughout the hierarchy of the tunnel users. 
Acting within a timely manner is another vital aspect of tunnel fire safety within the busway and the 
railway. Figure 52 below shows the relationship between the actions that have to occur to egress 
and the increased time that each actions causes which potentially may cause the loss of life. It was 
mentioned within section 6.5 that the longer the time to egress the higher the chance of fatality. The 
busway and rail way can have a far more effective egress time than a regular road tunnel as staff are 
involved who have training in the egress of large amounts of people. However as bus and train can 
hold large amounts of commuters (especially in peak hour traffic) there could be impact upon 
egress time due to queuing. Figure 52 outlines the all considerations are related to time for egress. 
Limited understanding of information surround tunnel fires (including the response plans, 
communication lines, fire science and evacuation plans) leads to poor decisions, breakdown in 
communication, slow response times and can cause maintenance problems. It is therefore important 
to have training of staff; including drivers, tunnel staff and operational staff. It is also important to 
educate the tunnel users through campaigns and advertising. 
Maintenance needs to be provided to ensure the system is operating at its design potential at all 
times.  
12.2 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The BaT tunnel is an asset that incorporates both bus and rail public transport into a single tube. 
The BaT tunnel also includes underground stations. A major limitation of this study was the 
assumption that the entire system could be viewed in isolation. This means that the study did not 
conduct an analysis upon the stations and the busway and railway were effectively analysed as 
separate tunnels. This is an untrue account of the tunnel as in extreme circumstances there is 
Figure 52 - Causes of fatality due to slow reaction times  
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possibility of the effects of a fire spreading throughout the 5.4km length of the BaT tunnel and may 
disperse into the stations. Hence for the completeness of work a study should be done into the 
human behavioural aspects that cause fatality within an underground station.   
Another limitation to the study is the assumption of basing the tunnel design on publically available 
information and assuming unknown parameters to allow the study to be undertaken. This has meant 
that the recommendations may be incorrect or incomplete as the correct system was not analysed. 
Hence, in the future studies should be conducted which includes real data.  
The study was done alone. Root causes are underlying problems that generally, are not focused 
upon. The fact that the study was conducted alone means that an input of ideas was not collated. 
The study would be more effective if a team of experience professionals and BaT tunnel design 
staff could perform a root cause analysis in unison. Hence, for completeness it is important to 
conduct the study with a group of BaT tunnel stake holders or authority figures. 
The study is also limited as only 1 scenario for the bus and rail tunnel was analysed. There may be 
different reactions to a tunnel fire given a different scenario. The tunnel also does not look into the 
factor that location within the tunnel plays upon the behaviour of the individual involved.  
The ventilation system plays an integral role to the characteristics of the fire within a tunnel. To 
analyse the effects of tunnel fires future work should include modelling of multiple scenarios to 
ensure the ventilation system can deal with the design fire adequately.  
Constraints were met in conducting a full analysis due to confidentiality related issues. Therefore, in 
the future it is recommended to include information from international operation manuals.  
  
 13 CONCLUSION 
The achievements of this study include: 
1. Documentation of publically available information in relation to the BaT tunnel 
2. Completion of a thorough literature review into tunnel fires, the risks they impose upon the 
tunnel structure and humans, contributing factors to tunnel fires and operation and 
maintenance of road tunnels 
3. Rigorous data collection was undertaken into historic road and rail tunnel fires, tunnel fire 
case studies and data relating the fires within buses. Data was also collected into the 
management of a multimodal tunnel that involves two countries. 
4. The use of a root cause analysis to provide recommendations to the BaT tunnel design in 
relation to the human behavioural aspects 
This study has met the criteria it set out to achieve however there are many limitations that 
could possibly have skewed the results. The aim of the study was to provide recommendations 
to incorporate into the BaT tunnel through the use of a root cause analysis. Following the 
completion of the analysis it was found that the critical factors associated within the tunnels is 
communication, timely response, adequate understanding and thorough maintenance. It is 
therefore recommended that thorough training be provided to all staff, educational campaigns 
and advertisements should be utilised within the public domain and finally sound management 
should be established prior to operations.  
The study conducted yields results to provide recommendations for use within the BaT tunnel 
design. There are however many limitations with the study and therefore to increase the 
accuracy of the results many more studies should be conducted for different fire design 
scenarios.  
The findings show that tunnel fire related fatalities to decrease with the increased amount of 
knowledge the tunnel users have. The bus driver reduce the amount of fires within the busway 
in comparison the regular road tunnels. 
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14 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1- Project specifications 
 
  
 Appendix 2 - List of historical tunnel fires 
Tunnel Year Mode Load Cause Other information 
Couronnes 
underground 
railway/metro 
station, 
France 
1903 Rail Passenger Electrical Fault 
84 deaths were 
estimated 
Batignolles 
tunnel, France 
1921 Rail Passenger 
Collision & use of gas 
lights 
28+ people 
died 
St Gothard, 
Switzerland 
1941 Rail Passenger Derailment 7 fatalities 
Torre Tunnel, 
Spain 
1944 Rail Passenger Multi train collision 
 
91 fatalities 
Holland 
Tunnel, NY, 
USA 
1949 HGV - Shedding its load 
 No fatalities 
 10 HGV’s 
destroyed 
 13 cars 
destroyed 
 66 people 
injured 
Stockholm 
underground 
railway/metro
, Sweden 
1955 Rail Passenger Overheating 
 Carriage was 
destroyed 
London 
underground 
metro, UK 
1958 Rail Passenger Unknown 
 1 fatality 
 
London 
underground 
metro, UK 
1960 Rail Passenger 
Arcing in Receptacle 
box 
 No fatalities 
 38 passengers 
suffered from 
smoke 
inhalation 
Stockholm 
underground 
railway/metro
, Sweden 
1960 Rail Passenger Short circuit - 
Blue 
mountains 
tunnel, USA 
1965 HGV Fish oil Engine fire 
 No fatalities 
 HGV was 
destroyed 
Suzaka 
Tunnel, Japan 
1967 HGV 
Polystyrene 
boxes and 
other 
combustible 
materials 
Unknown 
 No fatalities 
 13 trucks 
perished 
 Fire was 
extinguished 
after 11 hours 
 Inadequate 
operations 
Moorfleet 
Tunnel, 
1968 HGV 
14t of 
polyethylene 
Overheating (breaks)  1 hour 
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Germany bags 
Simplon 
Tunnel, 
Switzerland-
Italy 
1969 Rail Passenger Unknown 
 The carriage 
on fire was 
detached and 
the rest was 
driven safely 
away 
Wallace 
Tunnel 
1970 HGV - Engine fire  No injuries 
New York 
underground 
railway/metro 
1970 Rail Passenger Unknown 
 1 fatality – a 
lady who 
returned to 
cabin in 
attempt to 
recover purse 
Wranduk 
Tunnel, 
Yugoslavia 
1971 Rail - Engine fire 
 Extreme heat 
prevented 
passengers 
from exiting 
through the 
closest portal 
and hence 
exited through 
portal 1.3km 
behind 
Crozet 
Tunnel, 
France 
1971 Rail 
1 goods train 
and 1 train 
carrying 
hydrocarbon 
Collision and 
derailment 
 2 fatalities 
Paris 
underground 
1971 Rail Passenger Arson 
 No fatalities 
 3 injuries 
Henri 
Bourassa 
railway/metro 
station 
1971 Rail Passenger 
Collision with the end 
of a tunnel 
 1 fatality 
Vierzy tunnel, 
France 
1972 Rail Passenger Tunnel collapse  108 Fatalities 
Alexanderplat
z 
underground 
railway 
1972 Rail Passenger Derailment  No fatalities 
Hokoriku 
tunnel, Japan 
1972 Rail Passenger Fire in restaurant 
 30 Fatalities 
 690 injured 
Porte d’italie 
underground, 
France 
1973 Rail Passenger Arson 
 2 Fatalities 
 Fire brigade 
were very 
quick 
Moscow 
Underground 
1974 Station Passenger 
Minor fire in metro 
station 
 Passengers 
prevented 
from 
evacuating 
  No fatalities 
Rosemont 
Underground, 
Canada 
1974 Rail Passenger Short Circuit  No Fatalities 
Mont Blanc 
Tunnel, 
France/Italy 
1974 HGV - Ignited 
 No fatalities 
 Fire brigade 
arrived 
quickly 
Chesapeake 
Bay Tunnel, 
USA 
1974 HGV - 
Fuel tank of vehicles 
ignited from an 
exploding tyre 
 No fatalities 
Congress 
Tunnel, USA 
1974 Rail Goods -  No fatalities 
New York 
underground 
railway, USA 
1974 Rail Passenger Technical fault 
 No fatalities 
 78 people 
injured 
Mexico City 
underground, 
Mexico 
1975 Rail Passenger Collision  50 Fatalities 
Moorgate 
Underground, 
UK 
1975 Rail Passenger Collision with a wall 
 44 fatalities 
 73 injured 
Boston 
underground, 
USA 
1975 Rail Passenger Broken Catenary  No fatalities 
Goodge 
Street, UK 
1975 Rail Passenger Fire in cross passage  No fatalities 
Guadarrama 
Tunnel, Spain 
1975 HGV Pine resin Ignition 
 No fatalities 
 Thick toxic 
smoke 
 Fire lasted 
2.75 hours 
Chateau de 
Vincennes 
underground, 
Paris 
1975 Rail Passenger Short circuit  No fatalities 
Finsbury Park 
underground 
1976 Rail Passenger Cable fire  No fatalities 
Lisbon 
underground, 
Portugal 
1976 Rail Passenger Electrical fire 
 No fatalities 
 $1.8 million in 
damages 
Porte d’italie 
Tunnel, 
France 
1976 HGV 
16t Polyester 
plastic 
Engine fire 
 No fatalities 
 12 injuries 
 1 hour fire 
San 
Bernardino 
Tunnel, 
Switzerland 
1976 Bus Passenger - 
 No fatalities 
 Fast response 
from fire 
brigade 
Christie Street 
Underground, 
Canada 
1976 Rail Passenger Arson  No fatalities 
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Paris 
Underground, 
France 
1977 Rail Passenger Minor fire  No fatalities 
Baltimore 
Harbour 
freeway, USA 
1978 HGV - 
Truck collided with a 
fuel tanker 
 No fatalities 
Mont Blanc 
tunnel, 
France/Italy 
1978 HGV - Collision  No fatalities 
Velsen 
Tunnel, 
Netherlands 
1978 HGV - Collision  5 fatalities 
Hansaring 
underground, 
Germany 
1978 Rail Passenger Fire  No fatalities 
San Francisco 
Underground, 
USA 
1979 Rail Passenger 
Short Circuit 
underneath the train 
 1 fatality 
 56 injured 
Paris 
Underground, 
France 
1979 Rail Passenger Short Circuit 
 No fatalities 
 1000 people to 
evacuate 
 
Eric Street 
underground, 
USA 
1979 Rail Passenger 
Transformer fire – 
train doors failed to 
open 
 No Fatalities 
New York 
underground 
1979 Rail Passenger 
Cigarette ignited an oil 
spill within a station 
track 
 No Fatalities 
Nihonzaka 
Tunnel, Japan 
1979 HGV - Collision 
 7 fatalities 
 Traffic 
congestion led 
to firefighting 
delay 
Altora 
underground, 
Germany 
1980 Rail Passengers Arson 
 No fatalities 
 4 injuries 
 
Kajiwara 
tunnel, Japan 
1980 HGV 
200 cans of 
paint 
Gearbox fire  1 Fatality 
Saki Tunnel, 
Japan 
1980 HGV - Collision  5 fatalities 
New York 
underground, 
USA 
1981 Rail Passengers 
Fault in current 
collectors 
 No fatalities 
 Evacuated by 
breaking glass 
 Fire brigade 
arrived after 
20 minutes 
and took 6 
minutes to 
extinguish the 
fire 
Okyabraskaya 1981 Rail Passengers Short circuit  No Fatalities 
 underground, 
Moscow 
London 
underground, 
UK 
1981 Rail Passengers -  1 Fatality 
Ramersdorf 
underground 
railway/metro
, Germany 
1981 Rail Passengers Technical fault  No fatalities 
Mont Blanc 
tunnel, 
France/Italy 
1981 HGV - 
HGV stopped 4.5km 
into the tunnel 
 No injuries 
recorded 
Washington 
DC 
underground, 
USA 
1982 Rail Passengers Derailment  No injuries 
Caldecott 
tunnel, USA 
1982 
Passenger 
car 
- 
Drink driving – 
Collision into petrol 
tanker 
 7 fatalities 
Piccadilly line, 
UK 
1982 Rail Passengers Electrical cable  No fatalities 
Salang 
Tunnel, 
Afghanistan 
1982 
Military 
convoy 
- Explosion 
 176-3000 
fatalities 
Frejus 
Tunnel, 
France 
1983 HGV Plastic Gearbox fault 
 No fatalities 
 2 hours to 
control fire 
Hauptbahnhof 
Underground, 
Germany 
1983 Rail - Electrical fault  No fatalities 
Percorile 
Tunnel, Italy 
1983 Lorry Fish Collision  No fatalities 
Felbertauern 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
1984 HGV - Break overheating 
 No injuries 
 Fire lasted 1 
hour 
St gotthard 
tunnel, 
Switzerland 
1984 HGV 
Rolls of 
plastic 
- 
 Very fast 
response by 
emergency 
services 
 Fire burned for 
30 minutes 
Landungsbru
ken 
underground, 
Germany 
1984 Rail - Arson 
 No fatalities 
 $3 million 
worth of 
damages 
Summit 
tunnel, UK 
1984 Rail 
Diesel and 
petroleum 
spirit 
Derailed 
 No fatalities 
 Fire contained 
by high 
expansion 
foam and 
water 
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San 
Benedetto, 
Italy 
1984 - - Bomb attack  17 fatalities 
Paris 
underground, 
France 
1985 Rail - Rubbish fire  No fatalities 
Grand central 
station, New 
York 
1985 Rail - Arson  No fatalities 
Mexico City 
underground, 
Mexico 
1985 Rail - -  1700 injured 
L’arme 
Tunnel 
1986 
Passenger 
cars 
Trailer Collision  3 fatalities 
Herzogberg 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
1986 HGV - Breaks overheating 
 Oversized 
extraction of 
the ventilation 
system 
allowed for 
effective fire 
fighting 
Gumefens 
Tunnel, 
Switzerland 
1987 HGV - Collision 
 2 Fatalities 
 Fire burned for 
2 hours 
Brussels 
underground, 
Belgium 
1987 Rail - Fire in station 
 No injuries 
 1000 
evacuated 
Moscow 
underground, 
USSR 
1987 Rail - Fire on train  No injuries 
Tanzenberg 
tunnel, 
Austria 
1987 
Passenger 
car 
- Suicidal car driver  No fatalities 
Kings cross 
station, UK 
1987 Station - 
Steps of wooden 
escalator fuelled fire 
and was thought to 
have begun by grease 
and fluff under the 
escalator 
 31 fatalities 
Mont Blanc 
Tunnel, 
France/Italy 
1988 HGV - 
Driver noticed smoke 
but did not stop until 
flames entered the cab 
 Fire fighters 
arrived within 
10 minutes 
Roldal 
Tunnel, 
Norway 
1990 
Passenger 
car 
- Engine overheated  No fatalities 
New York 
underground, 
USA 
1990 Rail  Cable fire 
 2 fatalities 
 Dense smoke 
 Wrong train 
evacuated 
Hischengrabe
n Tunnel, 
1991 Rail - - 
 No fatalities 
 Driver was 
 Switzerland unaware of 
fire 
 After 2 
minutes 
passengers 
were 
instructed to 
evacuate 
Hovden 
Tunnel, 
Norway 
1993 
Passenger 
car 
- 
Collision of 2 cars and 
a motorcycle 
 No fatalities 
 Significant 
damage to 
tunnel 
Huguenot 
Tunnel, South 
Africa 
1994 Bus 
45 
passengers 
Gearbox 
 Unknown 
amount of 
fatalities 
 7 people 
jumped from 
moving 
vehicle 
 Fire was not 
extinguished 
when small 
and therefore 
grew 
 12 minutes for 
fire brigade to 
reach the site 
Castellar 
tunnel, France 
1994 HGV Waste paper Exploding tyre  No fatalities 
St Gotthard 
Tunnel, 
Switzerland 
1994 HGV 
750 bicycles 
in cardboard 
boxes 
- 
 No fatalities 
 2 hours to 
extinguish fire 
Kingsway 
Tunnel, UK 
1994 Bus - Fire 
 No fatalities 
 Lasted over 1 
hour 
Hitra Tunnel, 
Norway 
1995 
Mobile 
crane 
 Motor fire 
 No body 
injured 
 2 hours to 
extinguish fire 
Pfander 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
1995 
Passenger 
vehicle 
- Fatigue and collision 
 No fatalities 
 Sufficient 
smoke 
hindering 
emergency 
response 
Baku 
underground, 
Azerbaijan 
1995 Rail - Electrical fault 
 260 
Passengers 
died 
 Trouble 
opening doors 
 Entire tunnel 
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filled with 
smoke in 
direction of 
evacuation 
 Tunnel 
reopened in 24 
hours 
Isola Delle 
Femmine 
Motorway, 
Italy 
1996 
Passenger 
car 
 
Crash involving a 
petroleum tanker and 
explosion 
 5 fatalities 
 After 6 
minutes there 
was an 
explosion 
Washington, 
USA 
1996 Rail - Short Circuit 
 No fatalities 
 Failure to turn 
off electricity 
and to stop 
other trains 
Ekeberg 
Tunnel, 
Norway 
1996 Bus - Engine 
 No fatalities 
 Fire lasted 2 
hours 
Channel 
Tunnel, 
France/UK 
1996 Rail 
HVG carrier 
shuttle 
- 
 No fatalities 
 Reached 
350MW 
 Ventilation 
was thought to 
help fire grow 
 7 hours to 
extinguish fire 
Prapontin 
Tunnel, Italy 
1997 HGV Textiles Breaks overheated 
 No fatalities 
 Fire lasted 4 
hours 
Exilles Rail 
Tunnel, Italy 
1997 Rail 216 cars 
Door dragging along 
electrical wiring 
 No fatalities 
 Fire fighters 
arrived 20 
minutes later 
Toronto 
Underground, 
Canada 
1997 Rail  
Rubber matting stored 
under the tracks in a 
shunting area 
 No injuries 
 Thick black 
smoke 
St Gotthard 
tunnel, 
Switzerland 
1997 
Car 
transporte
r 
 Engine fire 
 No fatalities 
 3 Hour fire 
St Gotthard 
tunnel, 
Switzerland 
1997 Bus - Engine fire 
 No fatalities 
 Extinguished 
in 20 minutes 
Gleinalm 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
1998 
Double 
decked 
coach 
 Short circuit 
 No injuries 
 
Gueizhou 
Tunnel, China 
1998 Rail Gas canister Tunnel collapsed  80 fatalities 
Leinebusch 1999 Rail Paper and Ball-bearing  No fatalities 
 Tunnel, 
Germany 
pulp overheated  12 hours to 
extinguish 
Mont Blanc 
Tunnel, 
France/Italy 
1999 HGV Margarine Diesel fuel leaking 
 39 Fatalities 
 Poor operation 
of the 
ventilation 
system 
 Lack of 
communicatio
n between 
France and 
Italy 
Railway 
Tunnel, Italy 
1999 Rail Football fans 
Rowdy behaviour – 
Smoke bomb was lit 
 4 people died 
Tauern 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
1999 HGV Spray cans Collision  8 Fatalities 
Montreal 
Underground, 
Canada 
2000 Rail - Cable fire 
 No fatalities 
 6 tunnels filled 
with smoke 
 Triggered 3 
explosions 
 Failure of 
electrical, 
communicatio
n and 
ventilation 
system 
Cross 
Harbour 
tunnel, Hong 
Kong 
2000 
Passenger 
car 
- - 
 No fatalities 
 Tunnel 
personnel 
were on the 
scene in 3 
minutes 
 Fire brigade 
took 5 minutes 
to arrive 
Berlin 
Underground, 
Germany 
2000 Rail - - 
 No fatalities 
 Smoke 
inhalation 
Seljestad 
Tunnel, 
Norway 
2000 Truck - Collision 
 No fatalities 
 Fire destroyed 
the 
communicatio
n cables 
 Ambulance 
arrived in 15 
minutes 
 Fire brigade 
arrived in 30 
minutes 
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Rotsethhorn, 
Norway 
2000 
Road 
tunnel 
- Collision  2 fatalities 
New York 
City 
Underground, 
USA 
2000 Rail - - 
 No fatalities 
 Firefighting 
took over 2 
hours and 20 
minutes 
Saukopf 
tunnel, 
Germany 
2000 
Passenger 
car 
- - 
 No fatalities 
 The fire 
brigade 
extinguished 
the fire easily 
Oslofjord 2000 HGV - Minor incident  No fatalities 
Kitzsteinhorn 
funicular 
tunnel, 
Austria 
2000 Rail - Hydraulic oil leaking 
 150 fatalities 
 Velocity of the 
ventilation 
was 10m/s 
Laerdal 
Tunnel, 
Norway 
2000 Bus 
50 
passengers 
Small fire started 
 No fatalities 
 Easily dealt 
with by the 
bus driver 
Toronto 
underground, 
Canada 
2000 Rail 
Refuse from 
old mill 
station 
-  No fatalities 
Dusseldorf 
underground 
2001 Rail - -  No fatalities 
Prapontin 
Tunnel, Italy 
2001 HGV - Unknown 
 No fatalities 
 Smoke 
inhalation 
injuries 
Kurt 
Schumacher 
Platz station 
underground, 
Berlin/ 
Germany 
2001 Rail - Arc lamp  No fatalities 
Tauern 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
2001 
Passenger 
Cars 
- - 
 No fatalities 
 Fire 
extinguished 
quickly by 
driver of car 
Schipol 
Airport, 
Netherlands 
2001 Rail - 
Electrical connection 
box in a rail tunnel 
 No fatalities 
 
Howard 
Street Tunnel, 
Baltimore, 
USA 
2001 
Freight 
train 
Hazardous 
material 
Detachment of cars 
 No fatalities 
 Tunnel closed 
for 12 hours 
 Reschedule of 
Baseball 
games 
Gleinalm 2001 Bus Swedish -  Driver drove 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
tourists bus out of 
tunnel before 
stopping 
 
Gleinalm 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
2001 
Passenger 
car 
- Head on collision  5 fatalities 
Gleinalm 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
2001 Bus Tourists - 
 No fatalities 
 Tunnel closed 
until coach 
was removed 
St Gotthard 
Tunnel, 
Switzerland 
2001 HGV Rubber tyres Collision 
 11 Fatalities 
 23 vehicles 
destroyed 
 Parallel 
service tunnel 
saved many 
lives 
 Fire burned for 
2 days 
Tauern 
Tunnel, 
Austria 
2002 Lorry  Faulty engine 
 No fatalities 
 Fire brigade 
under control 
very quickly 
Ted Williams 
Tunnel, 
Boston, USA 
2002 Bus 
Seattle 
Mariners 
Baseball 
Electrical 
compartment at the 
rear of the bus 
 No fatalities 
 A lot of smoke 
but no damage 
to tunnel 
Homer 
Tunnel, New 
Zealand 
2002 Bus Tourist Engine Fire 
 No fatalities 
 Bus rolled 
backwards 
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Jungangno 
underground, 
South Korea 
2003 Rail - Arson- petrol and 
cigarette lighters 
 Many Fatalities 
 After the 
operators were 
aware of the fire a 
second train 
entered the tunnel 
and the doors of 
the second train 
did not open 
Cret d’eau 
Tunnel, France 
2003 Rail - Within sleeper 
carriage of the train 
 No fatalities 
 Lack of planned 
emergency 
evacuation 
procedures 
Mornay 
Tunnel, France 
2003 Rail - -  No fatalities 
 Once fire detected 
train stopped 
immediately 
Locica Tunnel, 
Slovenia 
2003 HGV Cargo -  No fatalities 
 28 vehicles 
entered the tunnel 
after stop signal 
was displayed 
Guadarrama 
Rail Tunnel, 
Spain 
2003 Rail - -  No fatalities 
 34 workers were 
trapped and hid in 
an air pocket 
Floyfjell 
Tunnel, 
Norway 
2003 Passenger 
car 
- Veered into the wall  1 Fatality 
Golovec 
Tunnel, 
Slovenia 
2003 Bus Fire fighters Engine fire  Able to 
extinguish fire 
 No fatalities 
Dullin Tunnel, 
France 
2004 Bus - Engine fire  No fatalities 
 Drove bus to 
tunnel portal after 
noticing fire 
Kinkempois 
Tunnel, Blgium 
2004 HGV - -  No fatalities 
 Safety systems 
operated 
appropriately 
 Appendix 3 - Busway casual factor charting 
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